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The main purpose of the first two chapters of this dissertation is to characterize the impact of mergers 
on firms’ incentives to collude, and to propose and evaluate the accuracy of different tools designed to 
assess the magnitude of coordinated effects. In addition, the third chapter empirically assesses the 
impact of a merger between two large retailers in the Chilean gasoline market, and evaluates the 
effectiveness of gas stations divestitures as a tool to mitigate a potential anticompetitive increase in 
prices. 
 In Chapter 1 (joint with Marc Ivaldi), titled “ssessment of Post-merger Coordinated Effects: 
Characterization by Simulations,  I examine the link between horizontal mergers and firms’ incentives to 
engage in collusion, and offer a novel approach for assessing the change in the merged firm’s critical 
discount factor (i.e., the minimum value of the discount factor that makes collusion profitable for a 
given firm). Results suggest that a merger can be used as a commitment device to increase the 
incentives to collude of merging parties, and depending on the characteristics of each merger, either 
diversion ratios or cross-price elasticities can be used as assessment tools. 
In a similar vein, in Chapter 2 (joint with Marc Ivaldi), titled Parallel “ccommodating Conduct: 
Evaluating the Performance of the Coordinated Price Pressure Index,  I study the performance of an index 
proposed by Moresi et al. (2011), which aims at measuring the impact of mergers on firms incentives to 
engage in tacit coordination to increase prices. This chapter also introduces two alternative indexes that 
require a larger set of information. Results suggest that the CPPI index only displays a fair performance, 
and show that both alternative indexes outperform the original one in terms of predicting mergers that 
result in a significant anticompetitive effect. 
Finally, in Chapter 3, titled Effectiveness of Merger Remedies: The Case of Chilean Gasoline Retail 
Markets,  I empirically assess the impact of a merger between two large retailers in the Chilean gasoline 
retail market and evaluate the effectiveness of gas stations divestitures as post-merger remedies. Results 
suggest a modest but significant effect of the merger on prices, and show that in certain cases the 












L’objectif principal des deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse est de caractériser l'impact des fusions sur 
les incitations des entreprises à la collusion, et d'évaluer la précision des différents outils conçus pour 
mesurer des effets coordonnés afin de proposer des outils plus adaptés. De plus, le troisième chapitre 
évalue empiriquement l'impact d'une fusion entre deux grandes entreprises de commerce de détail de 
carburant au Chili et évalue l'efficacité des cessions d’actifs dans ce cas, des stations-service) comme 
outil pour atténuer les effets d’une potentielle augmentation anticoncurrentielle des prix. 
Dans le Chapitre 1 (co-écrit avec Marc Ivaldi), intitulé « Évaluation des effets coordonnés post-
fusion : caractérisation par simulations », j'examine le lien entre les fusions horizontales et les incitations 
des entreprises à la collusion, et je propose une nouvelle approche pour évaluer le changement du « 
facteur d’actualisation seuil » des entreprises fusionnées c’est-à-dire, la valeur minimale du facteur 
d’actualisation en dessous duquel les entreprises sont incitées à dévier . Les résultats suggèrent qu'une 
fusion peut être utilisée comme un dispositif d'engagement à la collusion par les entreprises fusionnées, 
et qu’en fonction des caractéristiques de chaque fusion, soit des ratios de diversion c’est-à-dire, la 
proportion des pertes des ventes ou de détournement de clientèle en cas d’augmentation des prix  ou 
soit des élasticités-prix croisées de la demande peuvent être utilisés comme outils d'évaluation. 
De même, dans le Chapitre 2 (co-écrit avec Marc Ivaldi), intitulé « Conduite parallèle 
accommodante : évaluation de performance de l’indice CPPI », j'étudie la performance d'un indice proposé 
par Moresi et al. (2011), qui a comme objectif principal d’évaluer l'impact des fusions sur les incitations 
des entreprises à une coordination tacite pour augmenter les prix. Ce chapitre présente deux indices 
alternatifs qui nécessitent plus d'informations pour leur mise en œuvre. Les résultats suggèrent que 
l'indice CPPI affiche une performance acceptable, et que les deux indices alternatifs sont plus 
performants en termes de prédiction des fusions conduisant a un effet anticoncurrentiel significatif. 
Enfin, au Chapitre 3, intitulé « Efficacité des engagements : le cas des marchés de détail de carburant 
au Chili », j'évalue empiriquement l'impact d'une fusion entre deux grandes entreprises sur le marché 
chilien de détail de carburant et j'évalue l'efficacité des cessions d’actifs dans ce cas, des stations-
service) comme principaux engagements post-fusion. Les résultats suggèrent un effet modeste mais 
significatif de la fusion sur les prix, et montrent que, dans certains cas, les cessions d’actifs étaient en 
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There are two stylized facts that make the study of coordinated effects of mergers a very relevant topic 
for research. First, every year we observe several mergers in many different countries and across very 
heterogeneous industries and sectors. Notably, from the mergers that are actually reviewed by 
competition authorities, almost all of them are finally approved.1 Second, the empirical evidence has 
shown a significant effect of cartels in raising prices faced by intermediaries and final consumers, which 
inefficiently reduces trade and consumers’ surplus.2 Yet, there is no consensus among practitioners on 
which is the best way to assess the link between both: mergers and firms’ incentives to collude.  
In this context, in Chapter 1 (joint with Marc Ivaldi), titled “ssessment of Post-merger Coordinated 
Effects: Characterization by Simulations,  I examine the link between horizontal mergers and firms’ 
incentives to engage in collusion. The main results show that a merger increases the incentives of the 
merged firm to collude, but weaken the incentives of non-merging parties, with the former effect being 
stronger. In addition, this chapter offers a novel approach for assessing the change in the merged firm’s 
critical discount factor (i.e. the minimum value of the discount factor that makes collusion profitable). 
On the one hand, in the case of a merger between two symmetric firms (in terms of payoffs), the 
competition assessment should rely on screening tools able to capture the size of the pricing 
externalities existent among the merging parties’ brands (for instance, diversion ratios). On the other 
hand, for certain mergers involving two asymmetric firms (in terms of payoffs), the magnitude of 
coordinated effects is directly related to the degree of pre-merger asymmetry of the merging parties in 
terms of their incentives to collude. 
In a similar vein, in Chapter 2 (joint with Marc Ivaldi), titled Parallel “ccommodating Conduct: 
Evaluating the Performance of the Coordinated Price Pressure Index,  I study the performance of an index 
proposed by Moresi et al. (2011), which aims at measuring the impact of mergers on firms incentives to 
engage in a specific type of tacit coordination to increase prices. The results suggest a fair performance 
of the index, but only in mergers involving firms with low diversion ratios among the products offered 
by them. Furthermore, this chapter introduces two alternative indexes that require a larger set of 
information, namely: the diversion ratios between the merging parties’ products, their own-price 
elasticities and margins. Results show that these alternative indexes outperform the original one in 
                                                          
1
 See for instance, the statistics of merger cases reviewed by the European Commission, available in the following 
link: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf 
2 For instance, Ivaldi et al. (2014) show that cartels in developing countries reduce production in the concerned 
markets by 15% on average. 
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terms of predicting mergers with a significant anticompetitive impact on firms’ incentives to coordinate. 
However, the percentage of cases displaying a Type II Error is still not negligible.  
Recently, policymakers have shown concern regarding the lack of ex-post impact evaluation of 
interventions carried out by regulators and competition authorities, especially in developing countries.3 
In particular, in the field of merger control the most common way of intervention is the implementation 
of post-merger remedies. These include rules regulating the way firms should behave (i.e., behavioral 
remedies) and/or deeper changes in the structure of markets (i.e., structural remedies). In this setting, 
the divestiture of assets in concentrated markets has emerged as the most popular remedy, mainly for 
two reasons: (i) it is relatively easy to implement and monitor, and (ii) because it potentially allows for 
entry, which is in theory the main source of mitigation of most anticompetitive concerns.  Nevertheless, 
very little is known regarding the actual effectiveness of these types of policies, and the conditions 
under which they are more useful.   
In relation to this topic, in Chapter 3, titled Effectiveness of Merger Remedies: The Case of Chilean 
Gasoline Retail Markets,  I empirically assess the impact of a merger between two large retailers in the 
Chilean gasoline retail market and evaluate the effectiveness of gas stations divestitures in certain local 
markets as a tool to mitigate any potential anticompetitive effects. Initially, this merger was blocked by 
the Chilean Competition Tribunal, which considered that divestitures and the entry of small brands in 
concentrated local markets would not be an effective remedy. The Tribunal reasoning was based on the 
fact that small brands would face important disadvantages vis-à-vis larger competitors, due to their 
impossibility to reach a minimum scale of operation that would allow them to benefit from economies 
of scale and scope in the supply of inputs (i.e., mainly transport networks to supply retail outlets with 
gasoline). 
The identification strategy relies on the fact that a merger between two national retail networks 
should be independent of previous characteristics of different small local markets. Using a novel dataset 
released by the Chilean government, I use geographical-information software to identify characteristics 
of local markets and implement a reduced-form difference-in-difference approach to capture the impact 
of the merger and divestitures on prices. Results suggest a modest but significant effect of the merger on 
prices, and show that divestitures were indeed effective in mitigating this anticompetitive effect. 
However, this latter result only holds for gas stations located within 2 Km. radiuses from the divested 
outlets. 
 
                                                          
3 See for instance the findings of an OECD report titled Competition and Market Studies in Latin “merica ,  
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This paper aims at evaluating the coordinated effects of horizontal mergers by simulating their impact 
on firms’ critical discount factors. We consider a random coefficient model on the demand side and 
heterogeneous price-setting firms on the supply side. Results suggest that mergers strengthen the 
incentives to collude of the merged firm, but weaken the incentives of non-merging parties, with the 
former effect being stronger. To assess the magnitudes of these effects, we introduce the concepts of 
Asymmetry in Payoffs and Change in Payoffs effects, which allow us to identify appropriate screening 
tools according to the relative pre-merger payoffs of merging parties. 
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The coordinated effects that could be induced by a merger are defined as the increase in the incentives 
for merging parties (insiders) and non-merging parties (outsiders) to explicitly or tacitly collude. Two 
types of effects can be identified in the literature. First, with fewer firms in the market, a merger could 
lessen the costs of coordinating and monitoring a cartel.1 Second, as the merged firm internalizes the 
pricing externalities among its brands, its pricing incentives are modified, which in turn affects firms' 
payoffs and induces a change in their incentives to collude.2 
So far, the competition authorities’ assessment of coordinated effects has mainly focused on the 
first type of effects. Notably, the 2004 European Horizontal Merger Guidelines (EHMG) establishes four 
conditions for the presence of coordinated effects, that is to say: 1) the ability to reach a common 
understanding of the terms of coordination; 2) the ability to monitor potential deviations; 3) the 
existence of deterrent mechanisms; and 4), the presence of external sustainability. To our 
understanding, all these steps refer to structural characteristics of markets and/or the nature of the 
interactions between competitors.3,4 While these elements are indeed crucial for an assessment of 
coordinated effects, none of them explicitly considers the impact of mergers on firms’ pricing behavior.5  
In this vein, our aim here is to characterize the risks of coordinated effects that are driven by the 
internalization of pricing externalities among the merging parties’ brands, taking as given the four 
preceding conditions. To do so, we use a simulation setting with a demand specified according to a 
random coefficient discrete choice model and a supply side composed by heterogeneous single-product 
firms that compete in prices. Using a large set of simulated markets, we measure the impact of a merger 
                                                          
1
 Ivaldi, Jullien, Rey, Seabright and Tirole (2003), identify a list of relevant market characteristics that may affect the 
sustainability of collusion 
2
 Davis  evaluates the impact of a merger on firms’ collusion and defection payoffs. “ simulation approach is 
used, considering a setting of price competition with differentiated products and linear demands. 
3 See Paragraph 41 of the European Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2004), which contains the necessary conditions 
for coordination to be sustainable. 
4
 See Aigner et al. (2006) for a review of the evolution of coordinated effects’ assessment within the EU 
5 For a detailed analysis of European Commission decisions involving coordinated effects’ assessments, refer to the 
following papers. (i) Aigner et al. (2006), for the Sony/BMG and Impala cases, show how the Commission used data 
on prices in order to search for evidence of coordination in the past. In addition, the qualitative analysis mainly 
focuses on product heterogeneity and market transparency. (ii) In Amelio et al. (2009), for the ABF/GBI Business 
case, it is explained that the Commission identified some structural changes in the market that would make (tacit) 
collusion easier to implement, monitor and sustain. Among the critical factors are: the decrease in the number of 
competitors, the enhancement of market transparency, more effective punishment of deviations, the reduction of 
incentives to deviate and the increase of competitors’ symmetry. iii  Finally, Motta , for the Airtours/First 
Choise case, explains that the Commission applied the concept of joint dominance and argued that the merger 
would increase the risk of collusion on capacities. 
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on firms’ payoffs under three different competition scenarios: one period static Nash-equilibrium, 
perfect-collusion, and defection from collusion.  
Unlike case studies, a simulation approach has the major advantage of allowing for the 
characterization of risks of coordinated effects under heterogeneous demand and supply conditions. 
Furthermore, this approach provides a large set of simulated markets, which can be relied upon to 
identify the economic conditions driving the effects of a merger. In particular, each simulated market is 
built from the combination of four elements: 1) a set of  consumers; 2) an indirect utility function with 
random coefficients; 3) a set of single-product firms with heterogeneous marginal costs, who compete in 
prices; and 4), products with differentiated quality attributes. In each simulation, the number of 
consumers and firms is kept constant. However, for each market, consumer preferences, firm marginal 
costs and product characteristics are randomly drawn from a set of chosen distributions. 
The simplest setting of repeated interaction under the traditional grim-trigger strategies is used 
to model collusion.6 A given firm is willing to collude only when the present value of its collusion 
payoffs is higher than the present value of its most profitable defection strategy. The Critical Discount 
Factor (hereinafter CRDF) is then defined as the minimum discount factor that makes collusion 
profitable. The change in coordination incentives induced by a merger is measured by the variation in 
the value of the CRDF.  
A merger has two different effects on merging parties' incentives to collude. First, the 
asymmetry among merging parties in terms of their relative payoffs affects the post-merger CRDF. 
Specifically, the CRDF of the merged firm is relatively closer to the pre-merger CRDF of the larger 
merging party. The reason is that the payoffs of the larger merging party have more weight on the post-
merger decision to collude. It is what we define as the Asymmetry in Payoffs (AP) effect. Second, since 
the merging parties internalize the negative externality among their brands that stems from the 
undercutting of prices, they charge higher equilibrium prices and become less aggressive when 
deviating from collusion prices.7 This effect which we define as Change in Payoffs (CP) effect  
increases the merged firm equilibrium payoffs, but decreases its deviation payoffs. In other words, on 
the one hand, the CP effect makes collusion less profitable, while, on the other hand, it increases firms’ 
incentives to collude. Thus, the direction and magnitude of the CP effect depends on which of these 
forces dominates. Regarding the impact of the merger on outsider firms, the merger only increases their 
                                                          
6
 A given firm sets the collusive price, if and only if, all the other firms set the collusive price in the previous 
periods. Any defection from collusion triggers retaliation by rival firms, which consists of playing the one-period 
static Nash equilibrium during all the subsequent periods. See Friedman (1971). 
7
 This result is also supported by Brito et al. (2013). Performing a merger simulation analysis with data from the U.S. 
wet shaving industry, the authors find that merging parties’ defection prices are indeed increased after the merger. 
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equilibrium payoffs. This makes the defection strategy more profitable for outsider firms, and therefore, 
decreases their incentives to collude.  
The simulation results suggest that the impact of the merger on the merging parties’ incentives 
to deviate is significantly stronger than its impact on equilibrium payoffs. Thus, a merger can be used as 
a commitment device to increase the incentives to coordinate of the merged firm. The results also 
suggest that, while the impact on the merged firm’s CRDF can be substantial after the merger, the 
impact on outsiders’ CRDFs is moderate. Moreover, through a set of sensitivity analyses, we draw some 
interesting conclusions regarding the impact of efficiency gains and higher product differentiation on 
firms’ CRDFs. For instance, the results suggest that the presence of efficiency gains tends to reinforce 
the impact of the merger on firms’ CRDFs i.e., by increasing the incentives for insiders to collude and 
by lowering the incentives for outsiders to collude).8 
In addition, we offer a novel approach for assessing the change in the merged firm’s CRDF. On 
the one hand, in the case of a merger between two symmetric firms (in terms of payoffs), the magnitude 
of the change is mainly driven by the CP effect. Thus, for these types of mergers, the assessment should 
rely on screening tools able to capture the size of the pricing externality. On the other hand, in certain 
mergers involving two asymmetric firms (in terms of payoffs), the magnitude of the change is mainly 
driven by the AP effect.9 Consequently, in this scenario, the magnitude of the change is directly related 
to the degree of pre-merger asymmetry between the merging parties, in terms of their incentives to 
collude. 
This paper is related to a strand of economic literature that studies how mergers affect firms’ 
incentives to collude via the use of simulation techniques. For instance, Davis and Huse (2010) present 
the first empirical merger simulation model in a differentiated product market to study coordinated 
effects. They focus on the merger between Hewlett Packard and Compaq in the network server market. 
Their results show that the CRDF of insiders would decrease after a merger, while the CRDF of 
outsiders would increase. Similarly, Brito et al. (2013) simulate the coordinated effects of mergers and 
partial horizontal acquisitions in the wet shaving industry. The study finds that both partial and full 
acquisitions generate a decrease in the CRDF of acquiring firms while increasing the CRDFs of the 
                                                          
8
 Nevertheless, there is a non-negligible percentage of simulated cases where the efficiency gains actually offset the 
impact of the merger on non-merging parties. Thus, an interesting research venue would be to explore the direction 
of the effect for these specific cases. 
9 We define two types of mergers between asymmetric firms, namely, (i) when the larger firm has the higher 
incentives to collude and (ii), when the larger firm has the lower incentives to collude. This distinction is important 




remaining firms in the market. Consistent with our results, both Davis and Huse (2010) and Brito et al. 
(2013) find that the effect on insiders is considerably stronger than on outsiders.10 
Note that our results are indeed consistent with the findings of previous empirical papers. 
However, we contribute to the literature in three additional ways. First, our simulation approach allows 
us to test the robustness of the results for a broad range of consumer and firm characteristics. Second, to 
the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that incorporates the impact of efficiency gains and 
product differentiation with the coordinated effects of mergers. Third, we provide useful guidelines for 
the assessment of coordinated effects. In particular, it is shown that the magnitude of change in CRDF 
can be measured by existing screening tools.  
Finally, it is important to highlight that the results derived here are to be interpreted only 
qualitatively. An empirical verification of the main conclusions is certainly an interesting venue for 
future empirical research. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of demand and 
supply, and the simple collusion scheme proposed to characterize the coordinated effects of a merger. 
Section 3 summarizes the basic characteristics of the simulation setting. Section 4 contains the main 
simulation results and develops a set of sensitivity analyses. Section 5 describes how the assessment of 
coordinated effects can be related to the AP and CP effects. Lastly, Section 6 presents our main 
conclusions. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Discrete choice model with random coefficients 
 
Closely following the methodology proposed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), 
we assume that consumer choices are expressed by means of a model of demand with random 
coefficients. The main advantage of this model is that it encompasses much more realistic patterns of 
own-price and cross-price elasticities between different products and firms.11  
                                                          
10
 Table C.1 in Appendix C summarizes the main results from these papers. 
11
 As explained by Nevo (2000), in contrast to a simple Logit demand model where substitution between products 
is driven completely by market shares, a random coefficient model of demand yields cross-price elasticities that are 
larger for products that are closer substitutes in terms of their characteristics. Moreover, this methodology has been 
widely used in the field of empirical industrial organization and competition economics in order to measure the 
competitive effects of mergers.  
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Specifically, we consider a set of  consumers, who buy at most one unit of a product . 
Preferences are represented by a random utility model, where product  provides the following level of 
(indirect) utility to consumer : 
 
 � , = ,  � , + ,  � , − + , , (1) 
 
where � ,  and � ,  represent product characteristics that determine the quality of product ,  is the 
price of product j and ,  is an idiosyncratic term related to both: products and individuals.12 We 
assume that the characteristic � ,  is drawn from a continuous random variable with distribution , 
while the second characteristic � ,  is assumed to be discrete, taking values 0 or 1, according to the 
discrete distribution . Moreover, note that all the parameters are specific to each individual: . =+ ̃ ,  , . = + ̃ ,  , and = + ̃ , where ̃ , , ̃ ,  and ̃  are random variables that follow 
known distributions ̃  , ̃  and ̃  , respectively. Having both continuous and discrete quality 
attributes renders the model more general, and allows us to capture a broader range of preferences.13  
In addition, consumers face an outside option, which provides them the level of utility: 
 
 � , = � + �̃ , + , , (2) 
 
where the term denoted by �̃ ,   is drawn from a continuous random variable, with distribution ̃ . 
Thus, for a given vector of prices , and assuming independence between consumer 
idiosyncrasies for product characteristics and the error term, the market share of product  is given by 
the following expression: 
 
 = ∫ ( ̃ , ̃ , ̃, �̃ , ) = ∫ ( ̃ ) ( ̃ ) ̃ �̃ , (3) 
                                                          
12 Note that this indirect utility function can be derived from a quasi-linear utility function. It does not contain 
income explicitly, because when consumers compare between different products (� , ⋚ � , ), the income variable 
vanishes. As explained by Nevo (2000), the quasi-linear assumption is only reasonable for some products. For 
instance, it would not be an adequate assumption for the car market, where wealth effects can play a role in 
consumers’ decisions. 
13
 In particular, Grigolon and Verboven (2014) highlight the importance of accounting for discrete sources of 
market segmentation not captured by continuous product characteristics. For instance, in the car market it is crucial 
to account for consumer heterogeneity regarding the domestic or foreign origin of products. Because it is more 
general, this specification allows for more reliable estimates of market definition. 
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with = {( ̃ , ̃ , ̃, �̃ , ) | � , � , }, for all ≠ , denoting the set of consumers that choose product . 
Finally, we assume that the error term  is distributed according to a Type I extreme-value 
distribution.14 
 
2.2 The supply side 
 
We consider  single-product firms. The profit function takes the simple following form:  
 
 Π = − , (4) 
 
where ,  and  are the price, the constant marginal cost and the market share of product �, 
respectively. The variable  is the vector of prices of all the brands in the market, and  is the number of 
potential consumers. Firms have complete information regarding the parameters ,  and , and the 
distributions of the random parameters are assumed to be common knowledge. 
Firms’ marginal costs are assumed to have the following form: 
 
 = exp( � , + � , + ), (5) 
 
where >  and  >  ensure that products with higher quality are more costly to produce. In 
addition, there is a firm-specific cost component , which introduces heterogeneity across firms. 
 
2.3 A simple collusion scheme 
 
The baseline model considers an infinitely repeated price competition game among heterogeneous 
single-product firms, where collusion sustainability is evaluated under the traditional grim-trigger 
strategies. The present value of the current and future flow of collusion profits has to be higher than the 
current defection profits plus the present value of the future flow of Nash equilibrium payoffs. Thus, 
collusion is sustainable at period  only if the following condition is satisfied for every �: 
 
 ∑ − Π ,∞= Π , +∑ − Π ,  ∞= + . (6) 
                                                          
14
 Hence, integrating-out the error term gives rise to the well-known Logit probabilities (or market shares). For 




The variables Π , , Π ,  and Π ,   are the collusion payoffs, the deviation payoffs and the Nash (or 
equilibrium payoffs) of the static one period game, respectively. The variable  is the discount factor. 
Under what we call perfect-collusion, the collusion profits are obtained by finding the vector of prices 
that maximizes the expected joint-profits of all the firms in the market.15 The deviation profit is obtained 
by maximizing the expected profit of a given firm, taking prices of rivals as given and set at the 
collusion level. Finally, the equilibrium payoffs are obtained by computing the one-shot Nash 
equilibrium in prices. 
It is assumed that consumer preferences, product characteristics and firm marginal costs do not 
change over time, which ensures that the stage-game played by firms is identical in every period. 
Therefore, for a given vector of prices, the expected payoffs are time independent. Then the previous 
equation can be simplified to: 
 
 Π− Π + Π− . (7) 
 
Rearranging terms we obtain the minimum value of the discount factor ∗ that satisfies this condition. 
 
Definition: The Critical Discount Factor (CRDF) of Firm � is the lowest discount factor for which Firm � has an 
incentive to collude. It is given by: 
 ∗ = Π −ΠΠ −Π . (8) 
 
Under this setting, every firm in the market faces a different CRDF, which is determined by the 
specific characteristics of each firm and its interactions with consumers and competitors (i.e., demand 
elasticities, marginal costs and product characteristics). A lower CRDF implies a larger set of discount 
factors for which collusion is profitable. Therefore, a decrease (resp., an increase) in the CRDF is 
interpreted as an increase (resp., a decrease) in incentives to collude.   
It is important to stress that many collusive equilibria exist. Indeed, for a given combination of 
discount factors, there are multiple combinations of supra-competitive prices that can be sustained 
under grim-trigger strategies. In this paper, we focus on the collusive vector of prices that maximizes 
the joint-profits of firms mainly for two reasons. First, this approach has so far been adopted by the 
empirical industrial organization literature; and second, since it focuses on a particular equilibrium, it 
                                                          
15
 The joint-profit maximization vector of prices is obtained by solving: Π � = � ,…, ∑ Π ,… ,= , where, 




renders tractable a rather complex problem. Consequently, it seems natural to select a model that would 
allow us to verify the empirical results from the literature. 
An alternative approach to studying coordinated effects is followed by Sabbatini (2015) who 
considers an equilibrium where firms share collusion gains fairly. In this situation, all firms have the 
same CRDF, and the assessment of coordinated effects is made by studying the impact of a merger on 
the set of collusion profits that can be achieved through a regime of fair distribution of gains.16 In other 
words, the assessment focuses on the tension between maximization of joint-profits and their fair 
distribution. One of Sabbatini’s motivations to focus on the distributive issues of cartels rather than on 
joint-profit maximization is that the perfect-collusion scheme may become unfeasible under the 
presence of important asymmetries among firms.  
 
2.4 The impact of a merger on firms’ prices and payoffs 
 
Intuitively, when two firms merge, they internalize the externalities that their pricing decisions have on 
one another’s profits. This fact has two implications for the merged firm’s payoffs: (i) the merger 
generates an increase in prices and payoffs under the one-shot Nash equilibrium, and (ii) the 
internalization of the pricing externality makes the merged firm less aggressive when (potentially) 
undercutting collusion prices, which in turn induces a negative change in deviation payoffs compared 
to collusion payoffs.17 
We express these ideas through a set of propositions. First, Proposition 1 shows that the post-
merger equilibrium prices of merging parties are higher after the merger. Moreover, the corollaries of 
Proposition 1 suggest that the payoffs of merging parties and non-merging parties are also increased (or 
at least unchanged). Next, Proposition 2 states that deviation prices are always lower than or equal to 
collusion prices. Finally, Proposition 3 derives the conditions under which the post-merger deviation 
prices are higher, and its corollary suggests that merging parties’ deviation payoffs are lowered. 
 
Proposition 1: Consider a merger between Firms � and . The post-merger equilibrium prices ,  and ,  
are higher than or equal to the pre-merger equilibrium prices , and , , respectively. 
See proof in Appendix A. 
                                                          
16
 The assessment relies on the concept of Balance Temptation Equilibrium introduced by Friedman (1971). 
17Note that perfect-collusion prices and payoffs are independent of the ownership of the firms in the market. For 
this reason, in the rest of the paper, we omit the superscripts post  and pre  when referring to collusion prices 




Corollary 1: The post-merger equilibrium payoffs of the merged firm are higher than or equal to the aggregate 
pre-merger equilibrium payoffs of Firms � and . 
Corollary 2: The post-merger equilibrium payoffs of non-merging parties are higher than or equal to their pre-
merger equilibrium payoffs. 
 
Proposition 1 illustrates the idea that the internalization of pricing externalities results in higher 
post-merger equilibrium prices for the merging parties. In particular, an increase in the price of one 
merging party generates divested sales that are partially captured by the other merging party. This 
latter effect incentivizes merging parties to raise prices.  
Corollary 1 relies on the fact that the merged firm has the option to set the pre-merger 
equilibrium prices of Firms � and . It is only profitable to modify these prices when they result in 
higher post-merger equilibrium payoffs. Corollary 2 is based on the fact that if the merged firm raises its 
equilibrium prices, a fraction of divested sales is captured by non-merging parties, which increases their 
post-merger payoffs. In addition, as prices are strategic complements, outsiders may also find it 
profitable to modify their own prices, thereby further increasing their post-merger equilibrium payoffs.  
 
Proposition 2: For every Firm , its pre-merger and post-merger deviation prices ,  and ,   are lower 
than or equal to its perfect-collusion price .  
See proof in Appendix A. 
 
Proposition 3: Consider a merger between Firms � and . If the post-merger deviation price of Firm  belongs to 
the interval [ , , ], and the pricing externality that Firm  exerts on Firm i is stronger than the marginal 
effect of  on Π , , , , − , , then the post-merger deviation price of Firm � is higher than its pre-merger 
deviation price.  
See proof in Appendix A. 
Corollary: If , > , , then the post-merger deviation payoff of Firm �, i.e., � , , , , − , , is 
lower than its pre-merger deviation payoff, i.e., � , , − .  
 
Proposition 3 formalizes the idea that, after a merger, the merging parties are less aggressive 
when potentially undercutting collusion prices. Specifically, the pricing externality that merging parties 
exert on one another prevents them from setting deviation prices that are too low. Moreover, the 
corollary stems from the fact that the price  that maximizes Π , , , − ,  is lower than , . 
(For further details, see the proof of Proposition 3 in Appendix A.) This implies that the aggregate post-
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merger deviation payoffs of Firms � and  are lower compared to their aggregate collusion payoffs. (i.e.,  � , , , , − , + � , , , , − ,Π +Π � , �, − +� , �, − ,Π +Π ). 
 
2.5 Asymmetry in payoffs and change in payoffs effects 
 
We focus on the difference between the CRDF of the merged firm and the CRDF of the merging party 
with lower incentives to collude, which we define as the Overall Effect of the merger. 
 
Definition: Let ,∗,  be the CRDF of the merged firm, i.e., 
 
 ,∗, = � , +� , − � +�� , +� , − � , +� , , (9) 
 
and let ∗,  and ∗,   be the pre-merger CRDFs of the merging parties, which are given by: 
 
 ∗, = � , �−�� , �−� , �                     ∗, = � , �−�� , �−� , � . (10) 
 
Then, the Overall Effect of a merger between Firms � and  is defined as follows: 
 
 , = ,∗, − �{ ∗, , ∗, }. (11) 
 
The superscripts post  and pre  stand for the post-merger and pre-merger periods, 
respectively. Equation (9) shows how the CRDF of the merged firm is influenced by the payoffs of both 
merging parties. The purpose of the Overall Effect is to measure how the incentives to collude of the 
merger firm compare with the incentives to collude of the merging party with lower pre-merger 
incentives to collude. Thus, a negative value of the Overall Effect can be interpreted as an increase of the 
merged firm’s incentives to collude with respect to the merging party with a higher CRDF (i.e., the 
highest CRDF in Equation 10). 
We study now the role played by two different effects: the asymmetry in firms’ pre-merger 
payoffs and the internalization of the pricing externality. Separating these effects should help reach a 
better understanding of the magnitudes of coordinated effects. Let us name them. 
The Asymmetry in Payoffs (AP) effect describes situations in which the brand with relatively 
larger payoffs weights more heavily on the resulting CRDF of the merged firm, thus having a higher 
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influence on its incentives to collude. For instance, if a large multinational firm acquires a small local 
competitor, then we would expect the resulting merged firm’s CRDF to be relatively closer to the one of 
the larger firm.  
The sign and magnitude of the Change in Payoffs (CP) effect is the result of two opposite forces 
triggered by a merger. As explained in Section 2.4, on the one hand, higher equilibrium payoffs increase 
the merged firm’s CRDF while, on the other hand, lower deviation payoffs decrease the merged firm 
CRDF.  
In order to measure the magnitude of the AP and CP effects, we define the following variable: 
 
 , � = Π , �+Π , � − Π +ΠΠ , �+Π , � − Π , �+Π , � . (12) 
 
Note that , � is just the CRDF of the merged firm, but without incorporating any change in 
payoffs due to the merger. Adding and subtracting  , � from Equation (11) yields the following 
decomposition of the Overall Effect into the CP and AP effects: 
 
 , = ,∗, − , �⏟        � +  , � − �{ ∗, , ∗, }⏟                � . (13) 
 
This formula shows that, in the extreme case where a merger does not modify the merging 
parties’ payoffs, the Overall Effect is exactly equivalent to the “P effect. ”y contrast, in the case of a 
merger between two perfectly symmetric firms (i.e., identical CRDFs), the Overall Effect is completely 
driven by the CP effect.18 
 
2.6 Non-merging parties 
 
As suggested by the Corollary 2 of Proposition 1, the only change induced by the merger for non-
merging parties is the increase in their equilibrium payoffs. It should be always the case that Π ,Π ,  for every � belonging to the group of non-merging parties. 
                                                          
18 By replacing each of the CRDFs in Equation (13) by their definitions in Equations (9), (10) and (12), it is 
straightforward to show that, in this case, the second term on the right hand side of Equation (13) vanishes. 
23 
 
Thus, for non-merging parties, the variation in their CRDFs is always higher than (or equal to) 




The simulation setting. We simulate 3,000 markets with 10,000 consumers each, using 12 different 
calibrations of the demand model. In all, we have 36,000 simulated markets.19 The different calibrations 
vary in terms of three different dimensions: the underlying distributions of continuous characteristics of 
products, the underlying distribution of consumers’ mean valuations for these continuous 
characteristics, and the underlying distribution of consumers’ mean sensitivities to prices. 20 
The underlying structural parameters and the distributions of random coefficients are chosen in 
a way that the resulting distributions of pre-merger own-price and cross-price elasticities are realistic,  
in the sense that their values are similar to real elasticity estimates from previous studies. Knittel and 
Metaxoglou (2014) made a selection of empirical articles using BLP-type models for the estimation of 
random coefficient Logit demands.21 We identify relevant reference values or intervals for own-price 
and cross-price elasticities.22 As Table B.1 in Appendix B exhibits, own-price elasticities are in general 
lower than 5. However, there is an important degree of variation across industries or even across brands 
within the same industry.23 There are also empirical papers reporting higher values for own-price 
elasticities.24 The same high degree of dispersion can be found on cross-price elasticity estimates, but 
their values are consistently lower than 0.4. 
The supply side. We construct the supply side, assuming competition between five single-
product firms, with heterogeneous but constant marginal costs for each firm and market. This number 
                                                          
19 A high number of consumers is necessary in order to get smooth market share functions. For instance, in the 
extreme case of having only one representative consumer, he/she would choose his/her preferred product, and the 
resulting market shares would be 100% for this product, and 0% for all the other products in the market. In 
addition, the representative consumer’s preferred choice could be constant for a wide range of prices, making the 
market shares unresponsive to price changes. It could also be possible to find a combination of prices for which the 
representative consumer modifies his/her preferred choice, thus drastically changing the market share of his/her 
previous choice from 100% to 0% (and the market share of his/her new choice from 0% to 100%). Therefore, the 
existence of a high number of consumers ensures the absence of these types of discontinuities. 
20
 The details can be found in Appendix B. 
21 These articles have been published in leading general interest journals and the top industrial organization 
journals. 
22 Considering only the subset of papers that provide explicit values for own-price and/or cross-price elasticities. 
23 For instance, Armantier and Richard (2008) identify a mean own-price elasticity of 2.22 among airline groups in 
the U.S. market. The difference among groups can be significant, ranging from 1.540 to 2.785. 
24 For instance, Bonnet and Dubois (2010) report an average own-price elasticity of 9.97 within the bottled water 
market in France (simple average across retailers and brands listed on the Table 6 of their article). 
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of firms seems appropriate, considering that, in general, cases raising coordinated effects concerns 
involve a low number of competitors, as documented by Petit (2010).25  
In the case of firms offering heterogeneous products and competing in prices, the vector of 
prices that maximizes the joint-profits of firms (perfect-collusion) could potentially generate a situation 
where a firm faces a lower payoff as opposed to the non-collusive outcome. For instance, in a perfect-
collusion scheme, it may be optimal to allocate a high market share to the firm with the lowest marginal 
cost, at the expense of high-cost firms. Consequently, since we are not allowing for side payments 
across competitors therefore winners  cannot compensate losers the perfect-collusion scheme 
may become unfeasible, as it may not satisfy the basic participation constraint of every firm in the 
market.26  
The game. Without loss of generality, we simulate the impact of a merger between Firms 1 and 
2, on the values of the CRDFs for every firm in the market. The timing of the game can be summarized 
as follows: 
1) Nature draws the underlying consumer preference parameters and firms’ cost components. 
2) Nature draws the product characteristics. 
3) Conditional on prices, firms can compute expected market shares. 
4) The one-shot Nash equilibrium on prices is solved. 
5) Consumers observe prices and product characteristics and eventually make their choice. 
6) In the case of collusion, steps 4) and 5) are repeated, but solving for the vector of prices that 
maximizes the joint-profits of firms. 
7) In the case of deviation by Firm �, steps 4) and 5) are repeated, the price that maximizes the 
expected profit of Firm � is computed by taking other competitors’ prices (set at the collusion 
level) as given.  
The simulated sample. As stated before, the main advantage of a simulation approach is that it 
allows us to study the impact of a merger in different markets, with heterogeneous consumer 
preferences, firms’ marginal costs and product characteristics. Most of the simulated price elasticities in 
this paper coincide with those found in the literature. For example, a high fraction of own-price 
elasticities are lower than 5 and a high fraction of cross-price elasticities are lower than 0.4. However, 
higher and more extreme values of both variables are also covered by the simulated sample.27  
                                                          
25 The author lists all the European Commission cases involving remedies for coordinated effects concerns and 
shows that in all of them the number of firms is lower than five.  
26
 This is indeed the main criticism made by Sabbatini (2015) to the joint-profit maximization approach. See the last 
paragraph of Section 2.3 above. 
27 Figure B.1 in Appendix B displays the simulated empirical distributions of own-price and cross-price elasticities 
for the different calibrations of the demand model. 
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Note that for different reasons, slightly less than 16,000 observations are not considered. First, 
11.96% of the sample is dropped because while computing equilibrium prices, the fixed-point algorithm 
used to solve the system of first-order conditions does not converge to a solution.28 Second, 13.48% of 
the sample is excluded because at least one of the pre-merger market shares is equal to zero.29 Third, an 
additional 9.66% of the sample is excluded because at least one of the own-price and/or cross-price 
elasticities has unrealistic extreme value.30 Fourth, 7.86% of the sample is not considered because the 
perfect-collusion scheme is unfeasible prior to the merger.31 Finally, 0.62% of the sample is dropped 
because of other reasons.32 
 
4. Coordinated effects’ characterization 
 
By definition, collusion is sustainable only if, for every Firm �, the condition ∗ is satisfied. For this 
reason we study the impact of a merger on the values of post-merger CRDFs, for every firm in the 
market. We consider a decrease (an increase, resp.) in the value of a given firm post-merger CRDF, as an 
increase (a decrease, resp.) in its incentives to collude. In this section, we focus on the impact of the 
merger on firms’ payoffs and on the Overall Effect as defined in Section 2.5.   
 
4.1 The impact of the merger on firms’ payoffs 
 
Table 1 displays the resulting price and payoff changes induced by the merger on merging (insiders) 
and non-merging parties (outsiders). For every scenario (Nash and deviation), the table exhibits the 
percentage of cases from the sample with a strictly positive or negative change in payoffs. In addition, it 
displays a comparison between the absolute variations in deviation payoffs with respect to Nash 
                                                          
28 As documented by Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014), BLP-type models are highly non-linear, which can raise the 
issue of non-convergence. Thus, the rate of convergence can be sensitive to the selection of specific parameters of 
the simulation design. For instance, in our setting, by increasing the maximum number of iterations to 2,000 
(instead of 200), the fixed-pint algorithm reaches convergence on an extra 1.15% of the cases. However, this comes 
at the expense of considerably longer computation time.  
29
 A priori this is not a problem; however, given that our purpose is to compare results across different markets, the 
number of competitors should be fixed. In addition, it does not make sense to estimate the impact of a merger when 
one (or both) of the merging parties has a market share equal to zero (recall that regardless of the market, we 
simulate a merger between Firms 1 and 2). 
30 The aim is to keep realistic values for own-price and cross-price elasticities. The own-price elasticity threshold is 
defined as follows: ̅ = �{ ̅ } . Where ̅  stands for the 99th percentile value of the own-price elasticity of Firm �. 
While the threshold for cross-price elasticities is defined as:: ̅ = �{ ̅ }. Where ̅  stands for the 99th percentile 
value of the cross-price elasticity between Firms � and  (for all � and , with � ≠ ). 
31
 “t least one of the firms’ perfect-collusion profits is lower than its pre-merger Nash profits. However, in all these 
cases, the joint-collusion profits are higher than the joint-equilibrium profits. 
32 The details of the dropped observations can be found in Table B.4 in Appendix B. 
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payoffs. The purpose is to verify whether the results are consistent with the propositions in Section 2.4, 
and to obtain an idea of which effect is dominant on the post-merger CRDF of the merged firm.  
As stated in Propositions 1 and 3, the merged firm should have an incentive to raise prices after 
the merger. Indeed, the simulation results confirm this prediction as both equilibrium and deviation 
prices are raised after the merger. (See rows 1 and 3 in Table 1.) It means that the merged firm gets 
higher profits under the Nash scenario but lower per-product deviation profits. (See rows 2 and 4 in 
Table 1.)33 This latter result is also consistent with the corollaries of Propositions 1 and 3. 
However, the most interesting result is that the negative variation in deviation payoffs is in 
absolute terms higher than the positive variation in Nash payoffs. (See row 5 in Table 1.) Intuitively, the 
reason is that, while firms' profits increase dramatically when they deviate from the collusion prices, the 
post-merger change in Nash payoffs is moderate. Therefore, a similar change in prices would have an 
asymmetric impact on payoffs.  
Finally, as expected from Corollary 2 of Proposition 1, the merger has a positive impact on 
outsiders’ equilibrium payoffs. (See row 2 in Table 1.) 
 
Table 1 - Impact of the merger on firms’ prices and payoffs  
Scenario  Variable Insiders Outsiders 
Nash (1) % of cases ∆PN >  99.99% 90.79% 
 (2) % of cases ∆ΠN >  100% 99.93% 
  Interpretation Anti-collusive Anti-collusive 
Deviation (3) % of cases ∆P >  99.99% No effect 
 (4) % of cases ∆Π <  100% No effect 
  Interpretation Pro-collusive No effect 
Comparison (5) % of cases |∆Π | > ∆ΠN 99.98% N/A 
  Prediction Pro-collusive Anti-collusive 
 Observations 40,378 60,567 
 
4.2 Post-merger discount factor variation 
 
Figure 1 displays histograms of the CRDF variations of the merged firm (Overall Effect) and of 
outsiders. The first interesting result is that, in 99.81% of the cases, the Overall Effect for the merged 
                                                          
33 These results are in line with what has been found by Brito et al. (2013). Indeed, the results of their counterfactual 
merger simulations applied to the wet-shaving industry in the U.S. suggest that both post-merger Nash and 
deviation prices are higher after the merger. 
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firm is negative.34  In other words, the coordination incentives of the merged firm are strengthened. In 
addition, as expected, the CRDF of non-merging parties increases in 99.79% of the cases.35 Nevertheless, 
the magnitude of this change is substantially lower than the impact of the merger on the merged firm. 
Indeed, the absolute change in the merged firm CRDF is higher than the change in outsiders’ CRDFs in 
97.41% of the sample.36 
 
Figure 1 – Impact of the merger on firms’ CRDFs 
 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this section, we conduct a set of sensitivity analyses based on the key exogenous parameters of our 
simulation setting. In particular, we evaluate how the results from section 4.2 are modified according to: 
(i) the introduction of efficiency gains (i.e., an exogenous shock on ), (ii) a higher degree of product 
differentiation (i.e., an exogenous shock on � , ) and, (iii) a higher consumers’ mean sensitivity to price 
(i.e. an exogenous shock on ). 
 
 
                                                          
34 There are 38 cases with a positive change in the CRDF. However, in 11 of these cases the variation is positive 
because post-merger collusion becomes unfeasible for the merged firm. This also explains the outlier value of 0.54. 
From the remaining cases, in 75% of them the positive change is lower than 0.012 and in 95% of them the change is 
lower than 0.056. 
35 There are 43 cases with a negative change in the CRDF. However, in all these cases the change is lower than 
0.0002 in absolute value. 
36 Without considering the 0.19% of cases where the merged firm CRDF has a positive change and the 0.21% of 
cases where at least one of the outsiders CRDF has a negative change. 
(*)For the sake of exposition, the graph only displays changes lower than 1 
Overall Effect Change in outsiders’ CRDFs 
Panel a) Merged firm Panel b) Outsiders 
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4.3.1 Introducing efficiency gains 
 
A merger that generates efficiency gains which in turn reduce marginal costs of production allows 
the merging parties to price their products more aggressively. This effect increases the payoffs that the 
merged firm receives under every possible scenario (i.e., Nash, collusion and deviation).37 Again, the 
impact on the merged firm CRDF is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher collusion payoffs make 
coordination more attractive, which in turn induces a negative variation on its CRDF. On the other 
hand, higher deviation and Nash payoffs make collusion more difficult to sustain, inducing a positive 
change in the post-merger CRDF. Regarding the non-merging parties, efficiency gains generate exactly 
the opposite effects on payoffs than those of merging parties.38 Therefore, the direction of the resulting 
impact of efficiency gains, on both insiders and outsiders, depends on which of these effects dominates.  
The simulations are repeated using the same set of calibrations, this time assuming that the 
merger generates efficiency gains that reduce the marginal costs of the merging parties. Two levels of 
efficiency gains are computed: (i) the exact amount necessary to mitigate the unilateral effects of the 
merger (low efficiency gains in Figure 2);39 (ii) twice this amount (high efficiency gains in Figure 2).40 
Figure 2 displays histograms with the additional variation on firms' post-merger CRDFs induced by 
efficiency gains. 
In general, the results suggest that, under the presence of efficiency gains, both the negative 
variation in the merged firm CRDF and the positive variation in outsiders' CRDFs tend to be reinforced 
with respect to the results shown in Section 4.2. Indeed, in the case of the merged firm, the efficiency 
gains induce an additional negative variation in the CRDF in 97.72% of the sample (for both levels of 
efficiency gains).41 Regarding the case of outsiders, the additional variation is positive on 90.7% and 
91.56% of the cases with low and high efficiency gains, respectively.  
                                                          
37
 Note that with different marginal costs, the vector of prices that maximizes the joint-profits also changes. We 
adopt the assumption that, after the realization of efficiency gains, the vector of collusive prices adjusts accordingly. 
This modifies the payoffs of merging parties and non-merging parties under both the collusion and deviation 
scenarios. 
38 Outsiders have lower payoffs under every possible scenario. Lower collusion profits make coordination less 
attractive for outsiders, while lower deviation and lower Nash payoffs make coordination more attractive for them. 
The resulting impact depends on which of these effects dominates. 
39
 The level of efficiency gains that ensures that the vector of Nash equilibrium prices is the same before and after 
the merger. 
40
 We apply a similar list of criteria to the ones used in Section 3 to drop observations from the samples with 
efficiency gains. Thus, when merging the three databases (the original one and the ones with efficiency gains), 1,177 
additional observations are lost. The main reason is that, when simulating efficiency gains, there is a higher number 
of markets in which the algorithm solving for equilibrium prices does not converge (after 200 iterations). 
41 This result is due to the fact that, for almost every market, the increase in collusion payoffs (pro-collusive effect) 
dominates over the increase in Nash payoffs (anti-collusive effect). For further details, see Table C.2 in Appendix C.  
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Note, however, that the percentage of cases in which the efficiency gains induce a negative 
variation in outsiders’ CRDFs is not negligible, although the magnitudes are small.42 This result is due 
to the fact that the decrease in deviation payoffs sometimes dominates the decrease in collusion payoffs. 
For further details, see Table C.2 in Appendix C. 
 
Figure 2 – Impact of efficiency gains on firms’ CRDFs *  
 
 
4.3.2 Product differentiation 
 
As it has been hinted in the literature, the impact of the degree of product differentiation is 
ambiguous.43 In particular, higher product differentiation reduces the profits that firms obtain from 
undercutting collusion prices (pro-collusive effect). Yet, this differentiation also limits the intensity of 
competition under the punishment phase (anti-collusive effect). In addition, the degree of product 
differentiation also has an impact on the vector of perfect-collusion prices, which in turn modifies firms’ 
optimal deviation strategies. Thus, all these factors simultaneously influence the direction of the final 
impact. 
In this section, we focus on the degree of product differentiation in the product sold by the 
merging party . Specifically, we look at the difference between � ,  (i.e., the continuous characteristic of 
the product sold by the merging party ), and the average continuous characteristic of the rest of 
                                                          
42 In particular, in 95% of the cases with a negative change in CRDF, the magnitude is in absolute value lower than 
0.015. 
43 For further details see Ivaldi et al. (2003). 
(*) For the sake of exposition, the graphs only display changes within the interval [-0.5, 0.5]. 
Additional CRDF change Additional CRDF change 
Panel a) Merged firm Panel b) Outsiders 
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products in the market (i.e., ∑ � ,≠ ). 44 Then, in order to measure the impact of product differentiation 
on post-merger CRDFs, we simulate an exogenous 10% increase in � , .45  
Figure 3 contains two box-graphs that display the resulting relationship between the pre-
merger degree of product differentiation of the merging party , and the additional change in post-
merger CRDF induced by the exogenous increase in � , . First, in the scenario where � ,  is higher than 
the average continuous characteristic of other brands in the market (i.e., a value higher than 0 in the x-
axis), higher product differentiation is mostly associated with a decrease in the merged firm CRDF (in 
96.35% of the sample), and with an increase of outsiders’ CRDFs in . % of the sample . Second, in the 
scenario where  � ,  is lower than the average continuous characteristic of other brands in the market 
(i.e., a value lower than 0 in the x-axis), the effect of lower product differentiation is ambiguous and the 
magnitudes are considerably lower than in the previous scenario..46 
Thus, at least for the case of a merging party with a high continuous attribute, the impact of 
higher product differentiation is similar to the impact of efficiency gains. (See Tables C.2 and C.3 in 
Appendix C.) 
 
Figure 3 – Impact of product differentiation on firms’ CRDFs *  
 
 
                                                          
44 For the purpose of the sensitivity analysis, we choose Firm 1 as the merging party . 
45 When merging both databases (the original one and the one with higher values of � , ), 726 observations are lost. 
The reason is that, after applying the criteria to clean both datasets (specified in Table B.4 in Appendix B), the 
observations dropped in each of them do not perfectly match. 
46 In this scenario we refer to lower product differentiation because the exogenous increase of the continuous 
characteristic of product  makes it more similar to the average product in the market. 
(*) For the sake of exposition, the graphs only display changes within the interval [-0.4, 0.4]. 
**  The term x  difference  stands for the pre-merger difference between � ,  and the average continuous characteristic 
from the rest of the products in the market. 
(***) The thresholds displayed in the x-axis are delimited by the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile values. 
� ,  difference � ,  difference 
Panel a) Merged firm (**) (***) Panel b) Outsiders (**) (***) 
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4.3.3 Consumers’ mean price sensitivity 
 
The impact of a higher  should be threefold. First, a higher  should make competition fiercer, thus 
increasing firms’ incentives to engage in collusion. Second, it should make deviations more profitable, 
because consumers become more responsive to price cuts. Third, since consumers are more sensitive to 
price, firms’ collusion profits should be reduced. Therefore, the direction of the resulting impact should 
be ambiguous.47 
We introduce a 10% exogenous shock on  in every simulated market.48 Its impact on firms’ 
CRDFs is negative in 56.42% and 60.65% of cases, for the merged firm and outsiders, respectively. (See 
Figure C.1 in Appendix C.)49 Consequently, it is not possible to draw precise conclusions regarding the 
impact of  on post-merger CRDFs.50 
 
5. Understanding the magnitude of coordinated effects 
 
In this section we provide a general guide for understanding the interaction of the Asymmetry in 
Payoffs (AP) and Change in Payoffs (CP) effects, which is important for assessing the magnitude of 
change in the merged firm CRDF. On the one hand, in the case of a merger between two symmetric 
firms in terms of pre-merger payoffs, the internalization of the pricing externality is what mainly drives 
the Overall Effect. On the other hand, in the case of a merger between asymmetric firms in terms of pre-









                                                          
47
 In parallel, we conduct a sensitivity analysis regarding consumers’ mean valuation for the continuous 
characteristic (i.e., the parameter ), which can be also interpreted as a change in . Indeed, a lower  should 
make price competition fiercer (equivalent to an increase in ). The reason is that now consumers care relatively 
less about quality (in relation to price). Therefore, the impact of  on firms’ incentives to collude should also be 
ambiguous. 
48 When merging both databases (the original one and the one with higher values of ), 1,075 observations are lost. 
The main reason is that, in the modified dataset, there is a higher number of markets where at least one of the 
market shares is equal to zero. 
49 In addition, note that the directions of the impact on insiders and outsiders are not correlated. 
50 As anticipated in Footnote 47, the exogenous increase in  has an ambiguous impact on firms’ incentives to 
collude. In particular, its impact on firms’ CRDFs is negative for the merged firm and outsiders, in . % and 
31.59% of the cases in the sample, respectively. 
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5.1 The merged firm 
 
5.1.1 A merger between two symmetric firms 
 
In this section, we consider symmetric merging parties in terms of their pre-merger equilibrium payoffs. 
For these types of mergers, the magnitude of the Overall Effect should be mostly explained by the CP 
effect. In this situation, a natural indicator to capture the size of the pricing externality between two 
brands that are imperfect substitutes is given by the diversion ratio, i.e., the proportion of sales that are 
divested from one brand to another as a result of a raise in prices. Practitioners typically use this tool for 
several purposes, including the assessment of unilateral effects, the measurement of the degree of 
substitutability between two brands, and the definition of relevant markets.51,52 In addition, some recent 
literature suggests that diversion ratios can be used to establish indices that quantify firms’ incentives to 
coordinate prices.53 
In the simulated sample, merging parties are identified as symmetric when the pre-merger ratio 
between the equilibrium payoffs of the larger and smaller merging parties is close to one. Note that in 
the rest of the paper, every time we distinguish between larger and smaller merging parties, we refer to 
their relative sizes in terms of pre-merger equilibrium payoffs, unless we explicitly state something 
different. Panel a) of Figure 4a displays the histogram of the Overall Effect for these symmetric firms, 
distinguishing mergers with low and high values of the pre-merger diversion ratios. Observe that, as 
expected, mergers with higher diversion ratios have on average a stronger impact on the change in 
CRDF.  
In addition, Panel b) contains a bar-graph that displays the fraction of the Overall Effect that is 
explained by both AP (i.e., the dark gray fraction of each bar in the graph) and CP (i.e., the light-gray 
fraction of each bar in the graph) effects, for each simulated market (displayed in ascending order with 
respect to the magnitude of the Overall Effect). As anticipated, in these types of mergers, most of the 
change is due to the CP effect. Furthermore, note that when the degree of payoff asymmetry is higher, 
                                                          
51 According to the 2004 European Horizontal Merger Guidelines, the unilateral effects (or non-coordinated effects) 
of a merger are defined as follows: “ merger may significantly impede effective competition in a market by removing 
important competitive constraints on one or more sellers, who consequently have increased market power.  (See Paragraph 
24.) 
52 See for instance the report Diversion ratios: why does it matter where customers go if a shop is closed?  
published by Oxera. Available at: http://www.oxera.com/getmedia/12fcf7e5-4496-4e7f-bc79-a36457c92f1f/Diversion-
ratios-(updated)_1.pdf.aspx?ext=.pdf 
53 See Moresi et al. (2011 and 2015). The CPPI and cGUPPI indexes measure the incentives of firms to engage in 
specific kinds of parallel accommodating conduct. 
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the magnitude of the Overall Effect that is due to the CP effect still can be deduced by the pre-merger 
diversion ratios between the merged firm’s products. See Panel a) of Figure C.2 in Appendix C.) 
 
Figure 4a – The magnitude of ∆ � � (Merged firm) – Very symmetric equilibrium payoffs (*) 
 
 
Finally, it is interesting to evaluate how the magnitudes of the Overall Effect are related to pre-
merger own-price elasticities. Traditionally, the competition assessment of the effects of a merger 
involves the definition of a relevant market, which is closely related to the study of firms’ own-price 
elasticities.54 In particular, high own-price elasticities would reflect the presence of intense competition 
from rival firms and/or the possibility to define a broad relevant market. Under these conditions, a 
merger would raise less anticompetitive concerns.  
Figure 4b contains histograms that display the Overall Effect of the merger, distinguishing 
mergers with low and high own-price elasticities of the merging parties’ products. The results clearly 
suggest that the magnitude of the Overall Effect is not related to the pre-merger own-price elasticities. 
The reason is that this variable is not a good predictor of the impact of the merger on firms’ payoffs. For 
instance, Figure C.3 in Appendix C displays histograms of the change in firms’ equilibrium and 
deviation payoffs, distinguishing merging parties with high and low own-price elasticities, and merging 
                                                          
54
 For instance, the merger guidelines published in 2006 by the International Competition Network, institution that 
gathers many competition authorities from around the world; suggest market definition as the first step of a merger 
assessment. Document available in the following link: 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc321.pdf 
(*) The ratio of pre-merger equilibrium payoffs is lower than the 25th percentile value (very symmetric firms).  
**  Where High diversion ratios  Low diversion ratios  stand for markets in which the pre-merger diversion ratios 
between merging parties’ products are both higher lower  than their th percentile value. 
 
Overall Effect Market � 
Panel a) Post-merger Overall Effect and pre-
merger diversion ratios (**)  
Panel b) Post-merger AP and CP effects 
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parties with high and low diversion rations between their products. Results suggest that diversion 
ratios display a significantly better performance when predicting the post-merger change in payoffs. 55 
 
Result 1: For mergers between symmetric firms, the construction of a screening tool that aims 
to predict the impact of the merger on the merged firm CRDF should be based on the pre-merger 
diversion ratios between the brands produced by the merged firm.  
 
Figure 4b – The magnitude of ∆ � � (Merged firm) – Very symmetric equilibrium payoffs (*) 
 
 
5.1.2 A merger between two asymmetric firms 
 
In this section, we consider asymmetric merging parties in terms of their pre-merger equilibrium 
payoffs. For these types of mergers, the payoffs of the smaller firm have a low influence on the post-
merger payoffs of the merged firm. Thus, the resulting CRDF is close to the pre-merger one of the larger 
firm. For this reason, it is necessary to distinguish two cases when the larger firm has, between the two 
merging parties: (a) the lowest pre-merger CRDF and, (b) the highest pre-merger CRDF. This distinction 
is important because, as it is shown, only mergers of the first type have the potential to generate a 
                                                          
55
 These results are in line with recent articles that suggest the degree of direct product substitutability among 
merging firms as a better screening tool for an assessment of the competitive effects of a merger. See for instance, 
Farrell and Shapiro (2010), who propose the use of margins and the extent of direct substitution between the 
merged firm’s products, in order to assess the unilateral effects of mergers. 
(*) The ratio of pre-merger equilibrium payoffs is lower than the 25th percentile value (very symmetric firms).  
**  Where High diversion ratios  Low diversion ratios  stand for markets in which the pre-merger diversion ratios 
between merging parties’ products are both higher lower  than their th percentile value. 
 ***  Where Low own-price elasticities  High own-price elasticities  stand for merging firms’ with pre-merger own-
price elasticities lower (higher) than the 25th (75th) percentile value (in absolute value). 
 
Overall Effect Overall Effect 
Panel a) Low pre-merger diversion ratios (**) 
(***)  




significant Overall Effect. In the simulated sample, merging parties are identified as asymmetric when 
the ratio between the pre-merger equilibrium payoffs of the larger and smaller merging parties is 
significantly higher than one. 
 
Case (a) The larger firm has the lower pre-merger CRDF  
 
This is the more intuitive scenario. For instance, it corresponds to the case of a larger firm acquiring a 
small maverick firm (i.e., a firm with a very high CRDF). Basically, the larger firm absorbs  the smaller 
one and the Overall Effect is almost equal to the pre-merger difference on CRDFs (i.e., �{ ∗, , ∗, } − � { ∗, , ∗, }). Panel a) in Figure 5a displays a scatter-graph between the pre-
merger CRDF difference and the magnitude of the Overall Effect. Note that there is an almost perfect 
correlation between both variables. Additionally, Panel b) contains a bar-graph that displays the 
fraction of the Overall Effect that is explained by both AP (i.e., the dark-gray fraction of each bar in the 
graph) and CP (i.e., the light-gray fraction of each bar in the graph) effects, for each simulated market 
(displayed in ascending order with respect to the magnitude of the Overall Effect). As anticipated, most 
of the change is due to the AP effect.56  
When the degree of payoff asymmetry is lower and the CP effect starts playing a more 
important role in explaining the Overall Effect, the fraction that is due to the AP effect still can be 
deduced by the pre-merger CRDFs’ asymmetry. However, the magnitude of this effect becomes weaker 
as the firms are more symmetric. (See Panel b) of Figure C.2 in Appendix C.)57 
Certainly, the most natural candidates to predict the degree of pre-merger asymmetry between 
firms in terms of their incentives to collude are market shares and cross-price elasticities.58 Specifically, 
larger firms and firms with lower cross-price elasticities (i.e., with higher degree of product 
differentiation) should be less tempted to deviate from collusion.59 The reason is that they would 
capture only a small fraction of consumers from rival firms (pro-collusive effect). However, a higher 
                                                          
56 In addition, as shown in the previous section, the fraction of the Overall Effect that is due to the CP effect can be 
approximated by the magnitudes of the diversion ratios. See Panel a) of Figure C.2 in Appendix C. 
57 Panel b) of Figure C.2 contains scatter-graphs that display the resulting relationship between the pre-merger 
CRDF difference and the magnitude of the AP effect, for different degrees of asymmetry between the merging 
parties in terms of their pre-merger equilibrium payoffs. The results show that the magnitude of the AP effect is 
always correlated with the pre-merger CRDF difference, independently of the degree of payoff asymmetry. 
However, the magnitudes of the AP effect are significantly stronger for mergers between asymmetric firms. 
58
 Ivaldi et al.  suggest that, among other factors, firms’ market shares and the degree of product 
differentiation can influence their incentives to engage in collusion. 
59
 Note that market shares and price elasticities are endogenous. Indeed, the presence of asymmetries in terms of 
these variables is probably the result of asymmetries in terms of other market characteristics, such as marginal 
costs, product attributes, firms’ pricing decisions, and consumer preferences, among others. However, since these 




degree of product differentiation should make competition under the Nash equilibrium less intense, 
weakening the incentives to collude.  
 
Figure 5a– The magnitude of ∆ � � (Merged firm) – Very asymmetric equilibrium payoffs (*) 
Case (a) The larger firm has the lower pre-merger CRDF 
 
 
In order to measure the degree of pre-merger asymmetry between merging parties in terms of 
cross-price elasticities, we look at the ratio of their weighted cross-price elasticities, i.e., , where  
( ) stands for the merging party with the smaller (larger) pre-merger equilibrium payoffs. The variable 
 is defined as follows: 
 
 = ∑ ∑ ≠≠ ∙ ∙ , (14) 
 
where  and  are the pre-merger market share and price of Firm �, respectively. 
First, Panel a) of Figure 5b displays histograms of the Overall Effect, distinguishing mergers 
with high and low ratios of pre-merger weighted cross-price elasticities (CPEs in Figure 5b). Results 
suggest that, merging parties that are more asymmetric in terms of this variable generate on average a 
stronger impact. Second, Panel b) of Figure 5b displays histograms of the Overall Effect, distinguishing 
mergers with high and low ratios of pre-merger market shares.60 Results show that, this variable is not a 
good predictor of the Overall Impact.  
                                                          
60 It is defined as the ratio between the market shares of the larger and smaller firms. 
(*) The ratio of pre-merger equilibrium payoffs is higher than the 75th percentile value (very asymmetric firms). 
 
Pre-merger CRDF difference Market � 
Panel a) Post-merger Overall Effect and pre-
merger CRDF difference 
Panel b) Post-merger AP and CP effects 
37 
 
Figure 5b – The magnitude of ∆ � � (Merged firm) – Very asymmetric equilibrium payoffs (*) 
Case (a) The larger firm has the lower pre-merger CRDF 
 
 
Result 2: For mergers between asymmetric firms where the larger firm has the lower pre-
merger CRDF, the construction of a screening tool that aims to predict the impact of the 
merger on the merged firm CRDF should be based on the degree of pre-merger asymmetry 
between the merging parties in terms of their cross-price elasticities. 
 
Case (b) The larger firm has the higher pre-merger CRDF  
 
This is the less intuitive case. For instance, it corresponds to a scenario in which a large established firm 
with low incentives to collude acquires a smaller competitor with high incentives to collude. For these 
types of mergers, the CRDF of the merged firm is mostly influenced by the payoffs of the merging party 
with low incentives to collude (i.e., the larger firm), which in turn implies a weak magnitude for the AP 
effect. In addition, provided that the degree of asymmetry between the merging parties is high, the 
smaller firm only exerts a weak externality on the pricing behavior of the larger firm, and thus, the CP 
effect should also be weak.  
(*) The ratio of pre-merger equilibrium payoffs is higher than the 75th percentile value (very asymmetric firms).  
**  Where High cross-price elasticity CPE  ratio  Low cross-price elasticity CPE  ratio  stands for firms with a pre-
merger cross-price elasticity ratio higher (lower) than the 50th percentile value. 
***  Where High market share ratio  Low market share ratio  stands for firms with a pre-merger market share ratio 
higher (lower) than the 50th percentile value (in absolute value). 
 
Overall Effect Overall Effect 
Panel a) Ratio of pre-merger cross-price 
elasticities (**) 




To verify this prediction, Panel a) of Figure 6 displays the histogram of the Overall Effect for 
asymmetric firms, distinguishing mergers that qualify as Case (a) or Case (b).  The results clearly 
confirm that the Overall Effect is substantially lower for Case (b).61 
 
Result 3: For mergers between asymmetric firms where the larger firm has the higher pre-
merger CRDF, the risk of coordinated effects is certainly low 
 
Figure 6 – The magnitude of ∆ � � (Merged firm) – Very asymmetric equilibrium payoffs (*) 
Cases (a) and (b)  
 
 
How to distinguish between Cases (a) and (b) 
 
Panel b) of Figure 6 contains box-graphs that display the relationship between the pre-merger ratio of 
merging-parties’ CRDFs i.e., �� ) and the ratio of their pre-merger weighted cross-price elasticities. 62  
The interpretation of the graph axes is the following: (i) on the y-axis, if the CRDF ratio is higher (lower) 
than one, it means that the smaller (larger) firm has the higher pre-merger CRDF; (ii) on the x-axis, if the 
cross-price elasticity ratio is higher (lower) than one, it means that the smaller (larger) firm has the 
                                                          
61
 As the firms become more symmetric, the Overall Effect is driven by the size of the pricing externality, and the 
distinction between Cases (a) and (b) becomes less relevant. Figure C.4 in Appendix C displays histograms of the 
Overall Effect, distinguishing mergers in Cases (a) and (b), for different degrees of asymmetry between the merging 
parties in terms of their pre-merger equilibrium payoffs. The results show that, only for mergers between 
asymmetric firms, the magnitude of the Overall Effect is significantly different between Cases (a) and (b).  
62As before,  ( ) stands for the merging party with the smaller (larger) pre-merger equilibrium payoffs. 
(*) The ratio of pre-merger equilibrium payoffs is higher than the 75th percentile value (very asymmetric firms). 
(**) For the sake of exposition, the graph only displays CRDF ratios lower than 4.97 (90th per. value). 
(***) The thresholds displayed in the x-axis are delimited by the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile values. 
 
Overall Effect Cross-price elasticity ratio 
Panel a) Post-merger Overall Effect, 
comparison between Cases (a) and (b) 
Panel b) Pre-merger CRDF ratio and pre-
merger cross-price elasticity ratio (**) (***) 
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higher cross-price elasticity. Results suggest that; (i) when the cross-price elasticity ratio is significantly 
higher than one, then the CRDF of the smaller firm is in general higher (i.e., previously defined as Case 
(a)), (ii) when the cross-price elasticity ratio is significantly lower than one, then the CRDF of the larger 
firm is in general higher (i.e., previously defined as Case (b)), and (iii), when the cross-price elasticity is 
close to one, then the identity of the firm with the higher CRDF is more ambiguous. Note that these 




The magnitude of the impact on outsiders’ CRDFs should be explained by the impact of the merger on 
their pricing decisions. Recall that the only change faced by non-merging parties is the increase in their 
Nash-equilibrium payoffs. Thus, the stronger the CP effect, and the higher the fraction of divested sales 
that goes from the merged firm to non-merging parties, then the stronger the impact of the merger on 
outsiders should be.  
Figure C.5 in Appendix C displays histograms of the change in a particular outsider CRDF, 
distinguishing mergers with low and high pre-merger diversion ratios from products sold by the 
merged firm to the product sold by this particular outsider firm  and mergers with weak and strong 
CP effect on the merged firm CRDF. The results show that the impact is on average higher for mergers 
with a strong CP effect, whereas the pre-merger diversion ratios do not seem to be good predictors of 
the impact of the merger on the outsider CRDF. 
 
Result 4: For the case of outsiders, the magnitude of the CRDF change is significantly 
stronger for mergers with a strong CP effect. However, the diversion ratios from products 
sold by the merged firm to the product sold by a particular outsider firm  are not good 




The simulation results suggest that a merger can strengthen the coordination incentives of insiders. 
However, the merger also makes outsiders less willing to collude since deviation becomes more 
attractive for them. The magnitudes of the results suggest that, while the impact of a merger on the 
merged firm CRDF can be substantial, its impact on outsiders’ CRDFs is moderate. These results are 
robust to a wide variety of parameters of the demand and supply model, and coincide with what has 
been found in previous empirical papers.  
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We provide a novel approach for the assessment of coordinated effects, separating the impact of 
the merger on the merged firm CRDF into two different effects: namely, the AP and CP effects. In the 
case of a large firm acquiring a small maverick firm, the impact of the merger is mainly explained by the 
degree of pre-merger asymmetry between the merging parties in terms of their incentives to collude. In 
the case of a merger between two symmetric firms, the impact of the merger is mainly driven by the size 
of the pricing externality. In particular, in the former case, the assessment should be based on the pre-
merger cross-price elasticities of the merging parties, while in the latter case the assessment should be 
built on diversion ratios. Finally, for the case of outsiders, results suggest that only mergers that 
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The Coordinated Price Pressure Index (CPPI) measures the incentives of two competitors to engage in a 
specific kind of Parallel Accommodating Conduct (PAC). Specifically, it measures the incentives of a 
leader firm to initiate a unilateral percentage price increase, with the expectation that one follower firm 
will match it. Using a large set of simulated markets, we measure the accuracy of the index in terms of 
predicting the impact of a merger on firms’ incentives to engage in P“C. In addition, we compare the 
performance of the original index against two alternative indexes that incorporate the pricing 
externalities existent among the merged firm brands. Results suggest that the CPPI only displays a fair 
performance when predicting the direction of change of firm’s incentives to engage in PAC, and only in 
mergers in which the diversion ratios between the merged firm brands are low. Moreover, it is shown 
that both alternative indexes dramatically outperform the original one in terms of predicting mergers 
with a significant anticompetitive impact, however, the occurrence of cases with a Type II error is still 
significant. 
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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the performance of the Coordinated Price Pressure Index (CPPI) 
introduced by Moresi et al. (2011). The CPPI measures the incentives of two competitors to engage in a 
specific kind of tacit coordination strategy to increase prices. Specifically, a leader firm increases its 
price by a certain percentage, expecting that a follower firm will observe this change and will match it 
by exactly the same percentage. This specific conduct is considered as a form of Parallel 
Accommodating Conduct (PAC).  
As explained by Harrington (2013), a PAC could lead firms to reach a supra-competitive 
outcome. Nevertheless, this conduct requires some kind of retaliation or deterrence mechanism in order 
to be successfully implemented by firms. The game considered by Moresi et al. (2011) is in line with this 
argumentation. In particular, the CPPI is derived from a simple model of repeated interaction between 
two firms, which explicitly considers monitoring and retaliation. The game is built as follows. (i) In a 
certain period, a leading firm increases its price by a given percentage. (ii) In the subsequent period a 
follower firm observes the price increase and decides whether to match it or not. (iii) When matching 
occurs, the price increase becomes permanent. When there is no matching, the leading firm reverses its 
price to the initial level, with the promise of not initiating any further attempt to engage in PAC. 
We construct a set of 50,000 simulated markets.1 The demand is derived from a discrete choice 
model with random coefficients. The supply side is composed by a set of heterogeneous single-product 
firms that offer differentiated products and compete in prices. The initial level of prices is obtained by 
computing the Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game (hereinafter, equilibrium prices). In each 
simulated market, we consider the engagement in P“C by two firms let’s say A and B), and for each 
firm, we compute the percentage price increase that maximizes the present value of the firm’s future 
expected profits. This exercise considers the actual changes in output that result from a given increase in 
prices. We define Actual Coordinated Price Pressure (ACPP) between Firms  and , as the minimum 
of the two percentage price increases potentially initiated by them. Thus, this measure can be seen as 
the lower bound of the actual supra-competitive prices that two firms can reach through PAC.  
The next step is to simulate a merger between one of these firms let’s say A), the acquiring firm, 
and a third firm let’s say C), the acquired or target firm. Under this new scenario, we re-compute the 
ACPP, but considering the fact that the acquiring firm in willing to initiate and to follow a PAC by 
                                                          
1 Using the same model and simulation setting introduced in Chapter 1.  
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increasing the price of its two products (i.e., its original product plus the product acquired after the 
merger . The impact of the merger on firms’ actual incentives to engage in P“C is measured as the 
variation of the ACPP induced by the acquisition, and this variation is used as the benchmark to 
measure the performance of the CPPI.  
Note that we use a modified version of the CPPI. The baseline index proposed by Moresi et al. 
(2011) considers the percentage price increase that leaves to the leader firm indifferent between 
increasing and not increasing its price (just-profitable variation). While the index used by us considers 
the percentage price increase that maximizes the present value of the leader firm’s expected profits 
(profit-maximizing variation). However, as already noted by Moresi et al. (2011), in practice this change 
is just translated into a small difference with respect to the baseline index.2 Indeed, the index built under 
the profit-maximization assumption is equal to one half of the baseline one. 
The accuracy of the index is measured in two situations: (i) its ability to correctly predict the 
sign of the change (ACPP % or ACPP < %), and (ii), its ability to identify mergers that generate a 
significant anticompetitive impact (ACPP 5% or ACPP < 5%). Then we measure the percentage of 
cases where the index leads us to incur in Type I and Type II errors. As usual, a Type I error denotes a 
case in which the index erroneously identifies a merger as anticompetitive, when is not. While a Type II 
error refers to a case in which the index fails to identify an anticompetitive merger. 
First, regarding the direction of change, results suggest that the CPPI only displays a fair 
performance, and only for mergers involving products with low diversion ratios between them. Second, 
the results suggest that the CPPI displays a poor performance when predicting mergers that generate a 
significant increase of firms’ incentives to engage in P“C. While the percentage of cases with a Type I 
error is almost zero, the percentage of cases where the index incurs in a Type II error is considerably 
high. The reason is that the index consistently underestimates the magnitudes of the actual ACPP 
variations. We believe that the cause of this problem is that the index omits important information 
regarding the strategic interactions between the brands produced by the merging parties. Indeed, the 
index does not consider any of the diversion rations between the acquiring and the target firms’ 
products.  
When the acquiring firm decides to increase its prices, a fraction of divested sales from one 
product are captured by its other product, and vice-versa. Thus, the higher the diversion ratios between 
the products of the acquiring and target firms, the lower the cost of initiating a PAC. Therefore, not 
considering this information leads to an underestimation of the actual impact of the merger. In order to 
account for the presence of this strategic effect, we build two alternative indexes and compare the 
performance of the CPPI against them. The first alternative index requires the same set of information 
                                                          
2 See Section II.C.3 of Moresi et al. (2011). 
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as the original one, plus the diversion ratio from the target firm to the acquiring firm. The second 
alternative index requires a much richer set of information, including: the diversion ratio from the 
target to the acquiring firm and vice-versa, the pre-merger price of the target firm, its margin and its 
own-price elasticity. 
Results suggest that the original index still outperforms the two alternative ones in terms of 
predicting the sign of the change. Nevertheless, the two alternative indexes dramatically outperform the 
original one in terms of predicting mergers with a significant anticompetitive effect. Indeed, the 
percentage of cases with a Type II error decreases substantially, while the percentage of cases with a 
Type I error is just marginally increased. Thus, considering the strategic interactions existent among the 
merged firm brands significantly improves the accuracy of the index in this regard. However, the 
percentage of cases in which the alternative indexes incur in a Type II error is still significant.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the index proposed by 
Moresi et al. (2011). Section 3 explains the simulations approach. Section 4 shows the main results. 
Finally, Section 5 presents our main conclusions. 
 
2. The CPPI index 
 
2.1 Pre-merger case 
 
We closely follow the definition proposed by Moresi et al. (2011). The PAC strategy consists in a game 
in which two (or more) competitors engage in a joint price increase without the need of explicit 
coordination or communication among them. In particular, a leader firm increases its price by a certain 
percentage with the expectation that at least one of its competitors will accommodate and follow a 
similar strategy. The game is defined as follows. (i) In period t, Firm A raises its price by a percentage 
equal to S  for at least two periods. (ii) In period t + , Firm B observes the price increase and decides 
whether to match it or not, by increasing its price by the exact same percentage. (iii) In period t +  there 
are two possible results. First, if Firm B decided to match the price increase in the previous period, then 
the change becomes permanent for both firms. Second, if Firm B decided not to match the price increase 
in the previous period, then Firm A returns to its initial price level and commits to not initiate further 
attempts to engage in PAC. 
Moresi et al.  propose an index that captures firm’s incentives to participate in the pricing 
strategy described in the preceding paragraph. However, we choose to study a variation of the original 
index. Instead of using the maximum percentage price increase that a firm is willing to initiate (just-
profitable variation , we use the percentage price increase that maximizes the firm’s expected profits 
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from initiating a PAC (profit-maximizing variation). In practice, this latter percentage is just equal to 
one half of the percentage considered by the original index.3 Thus, considering this variation, the 
percentage price increase that Firm A is willing to initiate is given by; 
 
 SI = δF −θ−δF × m , (9) 
 
with � = ee  and  θ = − m e . The pre-merger market shares of Firms A and B are given by q  
and q , respectively. The term m  is the percentage margin charged by Firm A, e  and e  are the own-
price elasticities of Firms A and B, respectively. The term δ is the inter-temporal discount rate, which is 
assumed to be equal for every firm in the market. The term DR  is the diversion ratio from Firm B  to 
Firm A. 
The cost/benefit trade-off faced by Firm A when initiating a price increase SI  at period t is 
captured by the term � . The numerator represents the size of divested sales from Firm B that Firm A 
would capture if Firm B decides to match the price increase (from period t +  onwards). While the 
denominator contains the size of divested sales from Firm A generated by the initial unilateral price 
increase (in period t). In addition, the term θ  measures potential deviations of Firm A with respect to 
equilibrium prices. Indeed, in equilibrium, it has to be the case that m e =  and θ = . Therefore, 
when Firm A is already pricing above the equilibrium, its incentives to initiate an additional price 
increase are reduced (provided that ∈ [ , ]). 
The percentage price increase that Firm B is willing to initiate is obtained by an identical 
procedure and it mirrors Equation (1). 
Finally, the pre-merger CPPI is given by; 
 
 CPPI = m�n{SI , SI  }. (2) 
 
Note that, as explained by Moresi et al. (2011), the percentage price increase that a firm is 
willing to follow is always higher than the percentage price increase that a firm is willing to initiate. 
Thus, CPPI  captures the lower bound of the range of percentage price increases that two Firms A and B could sustain through PAC. 
 
 
                                                          
3 The mathematical derivations of both indexes are presented in the Technical Appendix of Moresi et al. (2011). 
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2.2 Post-merger variation 
 
Our purpose is to measure the change in the incentives of Firms A and B to engage in PAC, after the 
acquisition of a third firm by one of them. Without loss of generality, we assume that Firm A (the 
acquiring firm) merges with a third firm called Firm C (the acquired or target firm). Under these new 
circumstances, we re-build the post-merger CPPI index considering the exact same set of assumptions 
proposed by Moresi et al. (2011). Specifically, to our understanding these are: 
1. The variation of the percentage price increase (only motivated by PAC) that Firm � is 
willing to initiate, i.e., ∆SiI with � = { , }, is measured with respect to the pre-merger level 
of prices. 
2. Thus, we abstract from the presence of unilateral effects. 
3. The merged firm (Firm AC hereinafter) raises the prices of all its products by the same 
percentage (i.e., SI = =  ).  
4. The post-merger sales of Firm AC are equal to the sum of the pre-merger sales of the 
merging parties (i.e., = + ). 
5. The diversion ratio from Firm B to Firm AC is equal to the sum of the pre-merger diversion 
ratios D  and  D . 
6. The diversion ratio from Firm AC to Firm B is equal to the divested sales from Firm AC that 
are captured by Firm B. We approximate this diversion ratio by the following expression: 
D , = ∂∂ +∂∂∂∂ +∂∂ . All the derivatives are computed using pre-merger prices and market 
shares. 
7. The product produced by Firm C has the same price and margin as the product produced 
by Firm A. Thus, after the acquisition, Firm AC faces the same elasticity, price and margin 
for both products.  
Then, considering this set of assumptions, the post-merger percentage price increase that Firm AC is willing to initiate takes the simple following form: 
 
 SI = δF , −θ−δF , × m            w�t�         � , = + e+ e . (3) 
 
Similarly, the post-merger percentage price increase that Firm B is willing to initiate is given by; 
 




Note that Equations (3) and (4) are derived from our interpretation of Moresi et al. (2011), since 
the authors do not present an explicit equation for the post-merger CPPI in the paper. 
Finally, the impact of a merger between Firms A and C, on the incentives of Firms A and B to 
engage in PAC, that is predicted by the CPPI index is given by: 
 




Using the same model and simulation setting introduced in Chapter 1, we simulate 50,000 markets, 
with 10,000 consumers and 5 single-brand firms in each of them.4 As in the previous chapter, it is 
assumed that consumer preferences behave according to a model of discrete choice demand with 
random coefficients. In addition, we assume that firms offer products with differentiated characteristics 
or attributes, including a continuous one and a discrete one. Firms have heterogeneous and constant 
marginal costs of production and compete in prices.5 In the absence of collusion or PAC, prices are 
determined by the one-shot Nash equilibrium.  
In each market, we simulate a PAC strategy between Firms A and B. The actual percentage price 
increases (as opposite to the predicted ones presented in the previous section) initiated by firms 
involved in PAC, are computed by maximizing the sum of firms present and future stream of expected 
payoffs, assuming that the competitor follows the price increase. Therefore, we observe two percentage 
price increases: the one potentially initiated by Firm A and the one potentially initiated by Firm B. Then, 
the Actual Coordinated Price Pressure (ACPP) is defined as the minimum of these two values. In other 
words, the ACPP represents the actual (instead of the predicted one by the CPPI) lower bound of supra-
competitive prices that Firms A and B can reach through PAC. (For further details regarding the 
computation of the ACPP, see Appendix D.) 
As a next step, we simulate the impact of a merger between Firm A (acquiring firm) and Firm C 
(target firm  on firms’ incentives to engage in P“C. Specifically, we re-compute the percentage price 
increase that Firm A is willing to initiate after acquiring Firm C (which we call merger firm or Firm AC), 
assuming that it applies the same percentage increase to both products. At the same time, we re-
                                                          
4
 In this case, we only consider the Calibration 12 of the simulation setting introduced in the previous chapter. For further details, 
see Table B.3 in Appendix B.   
5
 As we explained in the previous chapter, the use of this approach ensures that the set of simulated markets exhibit a much more 
realistic pattern of own and cross-price elasticities. (See for instance, Nevo 2000.) In addition, having both continuous and discrete 
quality attributes renders the model more general, and allows us to capture a wider range of preferences. (See for instance, 
Grigolon and Verboven 2014.) For further details regarding the simulation setting see Chapter 1. 
49 
 
compute the percentage price increase that Firm B is willing to initiate, assuming that it will be followed 
by the two products of the merged firm. The post-merger ACPP is then defined as the minimum of 
these two adjusted  percentage price increases. The impact of the merger is measured as the change in 
the ACPP. (For further details regarding the computation of the ACPP variation, see Appendix D.) 
Thus, a positive ACPP variation represents an increase of the lower bound of prices that two firms can 
reach through PAC, and it can be considered as an anticompetitive effect. 
However, an additional adjustment is made to the simulated price increase initiated by the 
acquiring firm post-merger. Since we are evaluating the impact of the merger with respect to the pre-
merger level of prices, we need to adjust for the potential presence of unilateral effects. In order to do 
so, we compute the percentage price increase that the merged firm is willing to unilaterally initiate, 
even if there are not competitors willing to follow it. Thus, the post-merger price increase initiated by 




In other words: 
 
 
Note that it is assumed that competitors that are not involved in the PAC strategy do not react 
and keep their prices at the Nash level. In addition, we are restricting the unilateral effects to be a 
percentage price increase equally applied to all the products offered by the merged firm. However, the 
post-merger level of equilibrium prices (Nash equilibrium) does not necessarily satisfy this condition. 
For further details regarding the maximization problem necessary to obtain the pre-merger and post-
merger values of the ACCP, please refer to the Appendix D. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main descriptive statistics of the set of simulated markets. There are 
already two interesting results that can be deduced from this table. First, on average the CPPI 
significantly underestimates the actual impact of the merger on firms’ incentives to engage in P“C. 
Second, as predicted by Moresi et al. (2011), the merger can actually reduce firms’ incentives to engage 
in PAC (a negative ACPP variation). Indeed, the ACPP change is negative in 13.57% of the sample.   
 
 




Percentage price increase 
initiated by the merged firm 
and followed by a third 
competitor 
Percentage price increase 
that the merger firm 
would unilaterally initiate    - 
PAC effect = Overall Effect Unilateral Effects   - 
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Table 3.1 - Summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Own-price elasticity Firm A -3.482956 1.171715 -24.35604 -0.4310398 
Own-price elasticity Firm B -3.482887 1.169006 -25.7864 -0.2349229 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C to Firm A) 0.1683257 0.1246738 0.000008 0.7511157 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C to Firm B) 0.1720856 0.1252642 0.000011 0.737363 
HHI pre-merger 2769.439 702.6352 2000.255 9441.809 
Predicted HHI variation 710.6348 581.8557 0.1590207 4890.431 
ACPP pre-merger 0.0456778 0.1350181 -0.000457 21.44375 
ACPP variation 0.0402753 0.153141 -2.213478 10.89305 
CPPI pre-merger 0.0213234 0.0369831 -0.4044157 0.5667104 
CPPI variation (*) 0.0068188 0.0549253 -2.449458   0.3343301 
Number of observations 46,093 





4.1 Performance of the index: magnitude of the ACPP change 
 
Figure 4.1 contains a set of scatter-graphs displaying the relationship between the value predicted by 
the index (∆CPPI ,  and the actual variation of firms’ incentives to engage in P“C ∆ACPP , ). The 
sample is classified in four groups, according to the actual value of the diversion ratio from the acquired 
firm (Firm C) to the acquiring firm (Firm A). The upper left panel displays the scatter plot of the 
observations under the 25th percentile, while the upper right one displays the plot of the observations 
between the 25th and 50th percentiles, and so on. It is clear to conclude, from a visual examination of 
the graphs in Figure 4.1, that the index has a better predictive power for those acquisitions with lower 
diversion ratios between the merging parties. 
The obvious explanation behind the existence of this asymmetry, it is that the index omits the 
information provided by the diversion ratios between the products offered by the merged firm. Indeed, 
when Firm A is evaluating to initiate a post-merger PAC with Firm B, it has to consider the cost of 
unilaterally initiating the price increase (i.e., the total divested sales). However, the higher the diversion 
ratios between the merging parties’ products, the lower the cost of initiating a P“C, and thus the higher 
the impact of the merger on the acquiring firm’s incentives to initiate such a conduct. Therefore, for 
higher values of the merging parties’ diversion ratios, the index underestimates the real impact of the 






Figure 4.1 – Predicted (∆����) and actual (∆����  variation of firms’ incentives to 
engage in PAC 
 
 
Figure 4.2 displays the empirical distribution of the ratio between the predicted variation of the 
percentage price increase that the acquiring firm is willing to initiate (∆SI = SI − SI ), and its actual 
variation. In other words, it shows the percentage of the actual variation that is explained by the CPPI, 
and it is denoted by r . As it seen in the graphs of Figure 4.2, for higher values of the diversion ratio 
from the acquired firm (Firm C) to the acquiring firm (Firm A), the distribution is centered around 0 
(zero). This fact has two implications. First, the index consistently underestimates the actual price 
variation (otherwise the distribution would be centered around 1). Second, for higher values of the 
diversion ratio, the index predicts the wrong direction (or sign) of the change on a high percentage of 
the cases in the sample (almost half of it).  
 
Result 1 
For high values of the diversion ratios between the products offered by the merged firm, the CPPI tends to 
significantly underestimate the actual impact of the merger on firms’ incentives to engage in P“C, and to 
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Figure 4.2 - Histogram of �� 
 
 
4.2  Performance of the index: direction of the ACPP change 
 
To study the performance of the CPPI when predicting the direction of change, the sample is classified 
in two groups: cases with ∆ACPP % and cases with ∆ACPP < %.. Then we measure the percentage 
of cases where the index leads us to incur in a Type I error and in a Type II error. A Type I error refers 
to cases in which the index erroneously classifies a merger as potentially anticompetitive, when is not. 
While a Type II error, corresponds to cases in which the index fails to detect an anticompetitive merger. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the results. It can be seen that in terms of cases displaying a Type II error, the 
CPPI displays a fair performance for mergers with a low value of the diversion ratio DR , however, the 
number of cases with a Type I error is still significant. 
 
Table 4.1 – Accuracy of the CPPI: predicting the sign of the change 
Diversion Ratio ∆ACPP < % ∆ACPP % 
Percentile Freq. Type-I error Freq. Type-II error 
25% 2,483 24.77% 9,040 12.88% 
50% 2,255 11.84% 9,268 15.47% 
75% 1,176 8.67% 10,347 29.22% 
100% 343 21.87% 11,181 38.85% 
Total 6,257 16.93% 39,836 24.99% 
 
Result 2 
In term of predicting the direction of the ACPP change, the CPPI only displays a fair performance, and 
only for mergers with low values of the diversion ratios between the products offered by the merged firm. 
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4.3  Identifying mergers that generate a significant increase in the ACPP 
 
 
To study the performance of the CPPI in terms of identifying mergers that generate a significant 
increase in firms incentives to engage in PAC, the sample is classified in two groups: cases with ∆ACPP 5% and cases with ∆ACPP < 5%. As before, we measure the percentage of cases in which the 
index leads us to incur in a Type I error and in a Type II error. Table 4.2 summarizes the results. The 
occurrence of cases with a Type I error is substantially low (0.41% of the total number of cases) and 
stable across the sample. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the index in terms of detecting anticompetitive 
cases is quite poor. Indeed, the index displays a Type II error in 75.08% of the markets, and in almost 
100% of the markets with mergers involving products with high values of the diversion ratio (from Firm C to Firm A). 
 
Table 4.2 – Accuracy of the CPPI: predicting a significant variation of the ACPP 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C / Firm A) ∆ACPP < 5% ∆ACPP 5% 
Percentiles Freq. Type-I error Freq. Type-II error 
25% 8,453 0.70% 3,070 56.09% 
50% 9,420 0.73% 2,103 71.56% 
75% 9,832 0.17% 1,691 86.16% 
100% 8,990 0.07% 2,534 97.32% 
Total 36,695 0.41% 9,398 76.08% 
 
Result 3 
The port-merger variation of the CPPI displays a poor performance when detecting mergers that generate 
a significant anticompetitive impact (∆ > 5%  on firms’ incentives to engage in P“C.  
 
4.4 Incorporating the strategic interactions existent between the merged firm 
products 
  
In order to test whether the CPPI would enhance its accuracy when taking into account the strategic 
interactions between the products offered by the acquiring and acquired firms, we compare its 
performance against two alternative versions of the index that incorporate this information. Indeed, 
when the merged firm evaluates the possibility of initiating a unilateral price increase, its decision 
incorporates the fact that some of the resulting divested sales from one brand are partially captured by 
its other brand and vice versa. This effect generates a positive externality between the merged firm 
products and it can increase the incentives of the acquiring firm to initiate a PAC. However, the fact that 
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the merged firm is generating divested sales from two products now (instead of only one product, as in 
the pre-merger case), the acquisition can actually increase the cost of initiating such a conduct in the 
first place. Therefore, the merger can also decrease the acquiring firm incentives to engage in PAC. The 
direction of the change depends on which of these effects dominates. 
Two alternative indexes are proposed: 
1. The first one uses the same set information than the original CPPI, plus the value of the 
diversion ratio from the acquired firm (Firm C) to the acquiring firm (Firm A) (i.e., the value 
of D ). We denote it by ∆CPPI ,  . For its construction we keep the same set of 
assumptions from Section 2.2. 
2. The second one uses much more information. In addition to the information required for 
the construction of the original CPPI, it also requires the diversion ratios between the two 
products offered by the merged firm, the pre-merger own price elasticity of the acquired 
firm, and the pre-merger margin and price of the product produced by the acquired firm. 
We denote it by ∆CPPI , . For its construction we relax the assumption than prices, 
margins, diversion rations and own-price elasticities are the same for the products offered 
by the merged firm (i.e., Assumption 7 in Section 2.2).  
For further details concerning the derivation of both alternative indexes, please refer to the 
Appendix E. 
Table 4.3 exhibits the performances of the three indexes (the original one plus the two 
alternative ones) in terms of predicting the direction of the ACPP change. The two alternative indexes 
display a better performance in terms of occurrence of a Type II error, however, the percentage of cases 
with occurrence of a Type I error is considerably higher. Therefore, there is no evidence suggesting that 
the alternative indexes display a better performance in this regard. 
 
Table 4.3 - Accuracy when predicting the sign of the change 
Diversion Ratio (Firm C / Firm A) ∆ACPP < % ∆ACPP %   
Percentiles Freq. Type-I error      Freq. Type-II error 
  ∆CPPI ,  ∆ ,  ∆ ,   ∆CPPI ,  ∆ ,  ∆ ,  
25% 2,483 24.77% 39.43% 41.16% 9,040 12.88% 8.87% 7.57% 
50% 2,255 11.84% 42.26% 37.16% 9,268 15.47% 9.45% 9.02% 
75% 1,176 8.67% 71.51% 58.67% 10,347 29.11% 7.76% 9.75% 
100% 343 21.87% 88.34% 80.76% 11,181 38.85% 5.09% 7.26% 







In terms of predicting the direction of the ACPP change, the two alternative indexes do not display a 
better performance than the original one.  
 
Table 4.4 exhibits a comparison between the performances of the indexes in terms of predicting 
mergers that generate a significant anticompetitive effect. It can be seen that the two alternative indexes 
incur in a higher percentage of Type I error, however, this increase seems to be moderate. Regarding the 
occurrence of a Type II error, both indexes dramatically outperform the original CPPI. Nevertheless, the 
percentage of cases displaying a Type II error is still significant. 
 
Result 5 
The two alternative versions of the CPPI significantly outperform the original index in terms of 
identifying mergers that generate a significant anticompetitive impact ((∆ > 5% , while just 
moderately increasing the occurrence of a Type I error. However, the percentage of cases displaying a 
Type II error is still significant. 
 
Table 4.4 - Accuracy when predicting a significant variation of the ACPP 
Diversion Ratio (Firm 
 / Firm ) 
∆ < 5% ∆ 5%   
Percentiles Freq. Type-I error      Freq. Type-II error 
  ∆CPPI ,  ∆ ,  ∆ ,   ∆CPPI ,  ∆ ,  ∆ ,  
25% 8,453 0.70% 2.77% 2.87% 3,070 56.09% 48.79% 31.82% 
50% 9,420 0.73% 1.89% 1.27% 2,103 71.56% 57.20% 36.14% 
75% 9,832 0.17% 3.82% 2.28% 1,691 86.16% 52.40% 37.37% 
100% 8,990 0.07% 12.63% 6.5% 2,534 97.32% 26.95% 25.14% 




We test the accuracy of the CPPI within a simulated environment, considering a system of non-linear 
demands and a supply side composed by heterogeneous firms that compete in prices. The results 
suggest that the index displays a poor performance when predicting significant changes on firm’s 
incentives to engage in PAC. There are two potential explanations for this result.  First, the CPPI is 
derived from a model with linear demands. Thus, it is expected that its accuracy is reduced in a model 
based on non-linear demands. Second, the CPPI does not consider the strategic interactions between the 
merged firm’s brands. Indeed, the cost of initiating a PAC may be reduced because a fraction of 
divested sales from one product are captured by the other products offered by the merged firm. 
Therefore, not considering this positive externality leads us to inaccurate predictions. 
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We show that incorporating the strategic interactions between the merged firm’s brands 
substantially increase the accuracy of the CPPI in terms of predicting significant variations of the ACPP. 
The occurrence of Type II errors decreases dramatically, while the number of cases with a Type I error 
increases just moderately. Therefore, these results highlight the importance of considering these 
interactions when building a model or an index which attempts to predict the coordinated effects of a 
merger. Nevertheless, even when accounting for these strategic interactions, the percentage of cases in 
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The aim of this paper is to quantify the impact on retail prices of the Shell-Terpel merger in the Chilean 
gasoline market, and to evaluate the effectiveness of gas stations’ divestitures in highly concentrated 
locations as a tool to mitigate an eventual raise in prices. The identification strategy relies on the fact 
that a merger between two national retail networks should be independent of previous characteristics of 
different local markets. Results show a modest but significant increase in margins of gas stations 
geographically affected by the merger. The divestitures were effective in mitigating this anticompetitive 
effect, but only for retail outlets closely located to divested stations, i.e., within a 2 Km. radius. Notably, 
these effects are symmetric for both merging and non-merging parties. Moreover, divested gas stations 
that did not keep the Terpel brand set significantly lower prices on average. Finally, the presence of 
unbranded gas stations and/or small alternative brands within a 1 Km. radius seems to be enough in 
order to offset the price increase generated by the merger in these specific locations. 
 
Keywords Divestitures - Gasoline Retail Markets  Merger Evaluation  Merger Remedies  
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Recently, Chilean congressmen have shown concerns regarding the possibility of anticompetitive 
practices among retailers in certain regions of the country, namely: i) homogeneity of prices across 
competitors, ii) the existence of asymmetric responses of retail prices to changes in import prices (i.e., 
quick reactions to increases in costs but low reactions to cost reductions), and iii), the fact that prices are 
considerable higher in some regions than in others. Moreover, they argue that large retailers pressure 
smaller competitors and its franchises in order to set a minimum floor for prices. 1 
In this context, in April 2012 the Chilean Competition Tribunal blocked a merger between Shell 
and Terpel, two of the largest retailers in the country, arguing that the merger could generate significant 
anticompetitive effects on retail prices. In particular, according to the Tribunal, Chilean markets are 
characterized by high levels of concentration and the presence of significant entry barriers, which 
creates substantial risks of post-merger unilateral and coordinated effects.2 In addition, in the Tribunal´s 
opinion a divestitures package and the entry of small brands would not be an effective remedy. The 
Tribunal reasoning was based on the fact that small brands would face important disadvantages vis-à-
vis larger competitors, due to their impossibility to reach a minimum scale of operation that would 
allow them to benefit from certain economies of scale and scope in their supply of inputs (i.e., mainly 
transport networks to supply retail outlets with gasoline). 
Nevertheless, this decision was reversed by the Chilean Supreme Court of Justice in January 
2013, and the merger was cleared but considering some remedies.3 Specifically, Shell and Terpel had to 
divest gas stations in all the communes where the variation of the concentration index (HHI) was higher 
than the safe harbor  thresholds established by the guidelines of the Competition Authority.4 As a 
result, Shell-Terpel had to divest 61 gas stations in 61 communes across the country, which corresponds 
                                                          
1 For further details regarding this discussion, see the Congress debate of April 18th 2012 (document written in 
Spanish), available in the following link: 
http://www.senado.cl/appsenado/index.php?mo=sesionessala&ac=getDocumento&teseid=34835&nrobol=&tema=T
ema&legiid=&parl_ini=906&tagid=6 
2 The decision of the Chilean Competition Tribunal is available in the following link (document written in Spanish): 
http://www.tdlc.cl/tdlc/wp-content/uploads/resoluciones/Resolucion_39_2012.pdf  
3 For further details, see the following statement of the company controlling Shell in Chile (document written in 
Spanish): http://www.svs.cl/documentos/hes/hes_2013010009882.pdf 




to approximately 30% of the stations operated by Terpel prior the merger.5 The merger was finally 
executed on June 2013, and the divestitures were implemented within the next six months.6  
The aim of this paper is to quantify the impact of the Shell-Terpel merger on retail prices, and to 
evaluate the effectiveness of divestitures as a tool to mitigate any eventual raise in prices. The 
identification strategy relies on the fact that a merger between two national retail networks should be 
independent of previous characteristics of different geographic markets. Thus, changes in concentration 
levels of different local markets due to the merger can be seen as exogenous, generating a kind of 
natural experiment in which different markets are being asymmetrically affected. The idea behind is 
that the impact of the merger on prices can be measured by differences between markets affected and 
not affected by the merger. 
I use data from a new website launched by the Chilean government (i.e., 
www.bencinaenlinea.cl) where each gas station in the country is mandated to report any change in 
prices. The data covers the period March-2011 / January-2015 and contains information of about 1,500 
gas stations across the country. The results displayed by a difference-in-difference reduced form 
regression suggest a modest but significant increase in prices of markets geographically affected by the 
merger. Moreover, results suggest that the divestitures of gas stations were effective in offsetting this 
raise in prices, but only for gas stations located within a 2 Km. radius from the divested stations. 
This article is related to two different strands of empirical literature. The first one is the 
empirical assessment of the impact of mergers on prices, using panel data and geographical variation of 
local market structures as identification strategy. The second one is the empirical study of the impact of 
post-merger remedies on prices. 
Regarding the former strand of literature, Hastings and Gilbert (2005) empirically examine the 
relationship between vertical integration and wholesale gasoline prices. They use discrete and 
differential changes in the extent of vertical integration into a large number of markets, generated by 
mergers in the West Coast gasoline refining and retailing markets in the United States. They find 
evidence consistent with the strategic incentive to raise competitors’ input costs, suggesting that vertical 
integration can have a significant impact on wholesale prices. Their identification strategy relies on the 
fact that market structure in individual markets should have been determined prior to the acquisition 
decision, and that the acquisition decision was made at the aggregate national level. 
Similarly, Houde (2012) studies an empirical model of spatial competition applied to gasoline 
markets. The model is estimated using panel data of the Quebec City gasoline market and then used to 
                                                          
5 For further details, see the following statement of company controlling Shell in Chile (document written in 
Spanish): http://www.svs.cl/documentos/hes/hes_2013030023330.pdf 
6 The auction was finally implemented in September 2013. For further details, see the following online newspaper 
(article written in Spanish): http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=112114 
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evaluate the consequences of a recent vertical merger. Both a reduced form difference-in-difference 
approach and a structural model with counterfactual simulations are estimated and compared. The 
identification strategy for the difference-in-difference estimation relies on the idea that a merger 
between two retail networks creates sharp changes in the structure of local markets. The results suggest 
that the merger led to statistically significant price increases, and the reduced-form estimates are also 
shown to align well with the merger simulation predictions. 
More recently, Ashenfelter et al. (2015) estimate the effects of increased concentration and 
efficiencies on pricing, as a result of a large merger in the U.S. brewing industry. According to the 
authors, two key features of the U.S. beer industry allow them to estimate the effects of the merger. 
First, due to regulations on the distribution of beer, different metropolitan areas can be viewed as 
separate markets. Second, there was substantial variation in how the merger was expected to reduce 
shipping costs and increase concentration across different regional markets. Identification requires that 
there are no region specific trends in pricing that are correlated with the predicted local increases in 
concentration or the reduction in costs. The results show small but statistically significant effects on beer 
prices from both: the increases in concentration and the reductions of shipping costs.7 
Finally, regarding the literature on post-merger remedies, Friberg and Romahn (2015) evaluate 
the impact of divestitures on prices, as a consequence of the Carlsberg-Pripps merger in the Swedish 
beer market. Using both a difference-in-difference approach and a structural model to run 
counterfactual merger simulations, the authors find that divestitures had a significant impact on 
offsetting the rise in prices generated by the merger. In addition, they show that the divestitures could 
be more effective when the recipient firm is smaller and when the set of divested products is larger. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Shell-Terpel merger 
and the data. Section 3 explains the identification strategy and displays the main results. Section 4 
contains the conclusions. 
 
2. Characteristics of the merger and data 
 
2.1 The merger 
 
The Chilean gasoline retail market is characterized by a high level of concentration. Indeed, prior to the 
merger only four brands accounted for more than 95% of the overall retail sales. Specifically, according 
                                                          
7
 Other papers that use panel data with difference-in-difference methodologies to estimate the effects of mergers on 
gasoline markets are Hastings (2004), Hosken and Taylor (2007), and Simpson and Taylor (2008).  
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to the Chilean Competition Tribunal, the leader retailer Copec had a market share equal to 54.9%, 
followed by Shell (16.8%), Petrobras (14.9%) and Terpel (9.7%). There are some smaller competitors 
given by unbranded gas stations and gas stations that belong to considerably smaller alternative 
brands, but their joint market share is lower than 5%. In this context, the Shell-Terpel merger took place 
in June-2013, after being initially blocked by the Chilean Competition Tribunal, but cleared by the 
Supreme Court of Justice afterwards. 
The extent to which a merger generates a significant increase in concentration in local markets 
is determined by the degree of complementarity of the networks operated by the merging parties. 
Specifically, two retail networks are said to be complementary when the overlapping of outlets 
locations in different geographical markets is low. Table 1 exhibits the number of communes where 
both Shell and Terpel were actively operating by the beginning of 2013. Shell had gas stations in 135 
communes and Terpel participated in 119 communes. There are 67 communes where they both jointly 
operate, these communes contain 63.8% of the gas stations branded Shell and 71.6% of the gas stations 
branded as Terpel. Therefore, the degree of complementarity between the two networks was low. 
 
Table 1 - Number of communes where both firms operate (*) (**) 
Firms' presence 
Terpel   
No Yes Total 




Yes 68 67 135 
    (21.5%)  (66.9%)    
Total 178 119 297 
(*) Reported in January 2013 
(**) The information in brackets shows the total percentage of gas stations of Shell and Terpel operating in these communes 
 
Regarding the market concentration generated by the merger, the Chilean Competition 
Authority considers the following thresholds as safe harbors: 
i. The predicted post-merger HHI is lower than 1500. 8 
ii. The predicted post-merger HHI lies between 1500 and 2500, and the index variation is 
lower than 200. 
iii. The predicted post-merger HHI is higher than 2500, and the index variation is lower than 
100. 
                                                          
8 The concentration index is equal to: = ∑ = , 
Where  is the number of firms and  is the market share of firm � 
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As a proxy for market shares, I consider the ratio between the number of stations of a certain 
brand and the total number of stations per commune. In 66 out of 67 communes, the predicted post-
merger HHI and its predicted change are above these safe harbor thresholds. Specifically, in all these 
communes the predicted post-merger HHI is higher than 1500, and the predicted index variation is 
higher than 200. Table 2 exhibits the predicted post-merger HHI and its variation for communes of 
different sizes.9 The overlapping of networks occurs mainly in medium size communes. Additionally, 
the data shows that the predicted variation of the HHI is lower for larger communes.  
As I discussed before, the identification strategy relies on the fact that the merger generates 
asymmetric effects in different geographic markets. Table 2 contains evidence supporting this feature. 
Indeed, there is an important number of communes where the merger should not have had any impact 
on market shares (or at least a relatively weak impact), vis-a-vis communes where its impact on market 
shares should have been substantial. 
 
Table 2 - Mean predicted post-merger HHI by commune size (*) 
Commune size Variable 
Both firms' presence 
No Yes 
Large HHI post-merger 3,578 3,165 
150,000 < population size HHI var. 0 592 
  Freq. 9 25 
Medium HHI post-merger 4,573 4,155 
25,000 < population size < 150,000 HHI var. 0 1,093 
  Freq. 70 38 
Small HHI post-merger 7,615 5,729 
Population size < 25,000 HHI var. 0 2,292 
  Freq. 151 4 
(*) Reported in January 2013 
 
As part of a set of post-merger remedies, the merging parties had to divest 61 gas stations in 61 
different communes of the country. These divestitures were implemented through an open auction held 
in September-2013, and the transference of gas stations to the winner bidders was done by January-2013 
                                                          
9 The predicted post-merger HHI is constructed in the following way: 
− = ℎ + + ∑−≠ ℎ ,  
Where  are the pre-merger market shares. Remember that I consider the ratio between the number of stations of a 
given brand and the total number of stations per commune as a proxy for market share. 
64 
 
(with a few exceptions, see the Appendix F for further details). Table 3 summarizes the timing of the 
merger procedure.  
 
Table 3 – Timing of the merger procedure 
Date Event 
November-2011 Merger notification 
Abril-2012 Merger blocked by the Competition Tribunal 
January-2013 Merger cleared by the Supreme Court of Justice 
June-2013 Merger is executed 
September-2013 Divestitures auction 
October-2013 / January-2014 Transference of divested stations to the winner bidders 
 
Finally, it is important to mention that there is a group of divested stations that left the market 
shortly after being transferred to the winner bidders. The most likely explanation is that these outlet 




Starting on March 2012 the Chilean government launched a website where users can follow prices of 
each gas station across the country (i.e., www.bencinaenlinea.cl/). The main objective of this policy was 
to increase the information available for consumers, allowing them to find the cheapest prices and thus 
increasing competition among retailers. Each observation in the database contains the price charged for 
each station, the exact date and hour of each price modification, the station’s location, the brand of the 
station and the type of gasoline.  
The database contains information of about 1,500 gas stations located in 297 communes of 
Chile. The available data covers the period March 2012  January 2015, thus considering both pre-
merger and post-merger periods. In all, I count with 983,494 observations. Nevertheless, for now I only 
focus on the most popular type of gasoline sold in Chile, i.e. gasoline with 93 octanes (hereinafter, 
Gasoline 93). In addition, I drop gas stations from certain communes of the country where I could not 
identify the addresses of the divested gas stations. For more information regarding the data cleaning 
process, see the Appendix F. 
Since I do not have sales information, it is not possible to compute average prices. Thus, the 
weekly retail price is defined as the last posted price of a given station in a particular week. This 
procedure seems appropriate because prices are usually modified only once per week. Figure 1 displays 
the frequencies of price changes per week, in 78.91% of cases the stations modify their prices once per 
week, in 9.68% of the sample stations modify their prices twice peer week, in 10.14% of the weeks 
stations do not modify their prices at all, and in very few cases prices are modified more than two times 
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within a week (the remaining 1.27% of the cases in the sample). The refinery prices are announced every 
Wednesday and retailers adjust their prices predominantly on Thursdays and Fridays (See Figure 1, 
Panel b). 
 
Figure 1 – Frequency and timing of price changes (Gasoline 93, national level) 
 
 
3. Empirical approach and results 
 
3.1 Identification strategy 
 
I focus on the number of competing brands within the radius around a specific gas station, rather than 
on geographical markets delimited by communes’ boundaries, mainly because the average retail price 
seems to be highly correlated with this former variable (see Figure 2, Panel a). By contrast, prices do not 
seem to be well explained by the level of the HHI index at the commune level, which was the tool used 
by the Chilean Competition Authority in order to identify risky markets (see Figure 2, Panel b). 
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the merger between Shell and Terpel, i.e., 
two national retail networks, is independent of previous characteristics of local markets (See for 
instance, Ashenfelter et al. 2015 who relies on a similar assumption). Indeed, as explained by Shell and 
Terpel during the merger review process, their decision to merge was driven by several reasons, 
including the strengthen of their brands, the saving of large fix costs, the reduction of variable transport 
costs, among others. Moreover, even though it is evident that from the merging parties point of view 
the potential increase in market power generated by the merger is also an important benefit; its 
evaluation should be done at the national level. Thus, the concentration levels and/or the number and 
(*) For the sake of exposition, one outlier observation is omitted (in which the price is changed 35 times within a week). 
Number of price changes Days of the week 
Panel a) Freq. of price changes per week (*) Panel b) Timing of price changes 
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identity of competing brands within specific small local markets should be independent of the firms’ 
decision to merge. 10 
 
Figure 2 – Pre-merger level of prices (Gasoline 93, Metropolitan Region) 
 
 
A natural way to verify the validity of this exogeneity assumption is to check whether the pre-
merger retail prices of gas stations geographically affected by the merger and the pre-merger retail 
prices of gas stations not geographically affected by the merger follow similar trends. In a difference-in-
difference framework, this is the well-known parallel trend assumption. Specifically, it refers to the fact 
that in the absence of treatment (for instance, a merger), the outcome of interest for both treatment and 
control groups would have followed a similar trend. (See for instance, Friberg and Romahn 2015 for a 
similar exposition.) 
In the setting presented in this paper, in order to define treatment and control groups, it is 
necessary to distinguish gas stations that belong to the merged firm and gas stations that belong to the 
group of non-merging parties. For the merged firm, a Shell (resp. Terpel) gas station is said to be 
geographically affected by the merger when a second gas station belonging to Terpel (resp. Shell) is 
located within a specific radius. See the examples in Panels a) and b) of Diagram 1 for a simplified 
illustration of the construction of treatment and control groups in this case (these examples are not 
exhaustive). For non-merging parties, a gas station is said to be geographically affected by the merger 
                                                          
10 In addition, the assets of Terpel-Chile had to be mandatorily sold to a firm different than Copec (the firm with the 
largest market share in Chile) before July 2012, as part of a set of preventive remedies imposed by the Chilean 
Competition Tribunal after the acquisition of Terpel-Colombia by Copec in December 2010. Thus, the timing of the 
Shell-Terpel merger in Chile can be also considered as exogenous.  
Number of competing brands (1 km. radius) HHI (Commune level) 
Panel a) Prices and number of competing brands (*) Panel b) Prices and HHI at the commune level (**) 
 (*) Unbranded gas stations and small brands are grouped in two separate brand categories.  




when both Shell and Terpel gas stations are located within a specific radius. See the examples in Panels 
c) and d) of Diagram 1 for a simplified illustration of the construction of treatment and control groups 
among gas stations belonging to non-merging parties (these examples are not exhaustive either). 
Consequently, gas stations geographically affected by the merger are defined as the treatment 
group, and gas stations not geographically affected by the merger correspond to the control group.  
 
Diagram 1 – Examples of treatment and control groups 
 
 
Panel a) of Figure 3 displays the pre-merger evolution of the average margin for gas stations 
affected and not affected by the merger (using 1 Km. radiuses), distinguishing insiders (Shell and 
Terpel) and outsiders (Copec and Petrobras). It is clear that the pre-merger evolution of prices follow 
very similar trends, regardless of the status of gas stations. In addition, Panel b) contains a map that 
shows the locations of gas stations within the Metropolitan Region of Chile. There are no clear specific 
patterns concerning the geographic distributions of the treatment and control groups (for a 1 Km. 


















Figure 3 – Pre-merger prices and geographic locations (Gasoline 93) 
 
 
3.2 Selection of divestitures 
 
As I explained before, the Chilean Supreme Court of Justice identified 61 communes where Shell-Terpel 
had to implement the divestiture of one gas station in each of them. However, within each commune, it 
was the merged firm who decided which gas station was finally divested. Therefore, the merging 
parties could have acted strategically by divesting the set of gas stations that would minimize the 
impact of the divestitures on prices. If this was the case, then the estimation of the impact of divestitures 
on prices would be downward biased, and it would only capture the lower bound of its effect. 
One way to test the existence of such a strategic behavior would be to verify whether the choice 
of divestitures is explained by specific features of local markets, including characteristics of the demand 
and supply sides. Nevertheless, in the current database I only have information regarding certain 
characteristics of the supply side, namely: the number and identity of competitors within certain 
distances, the prices and margins charged by these gas stations, and some other characteristics of gas 
stations (i.e., self-service option, the availability of a grocery store, public toilets, a pharmacy and car 
maintenance services).  
Table G.1 in Appendix G exhibits the results from different Logit regressions estimating the 
probability of a given Shell-Terpel gas station being divested, as a function of certain pre-merger 
characteristics. These regressions only consider gas stations operating in communes where the Court 
identified potential risks of anticompetitive effects. The results suggest that the majority of explanatory 
variables do not have a significant impact on the probability of a given station being divested.  Only 
(*) Treatment and control groups are defined using 1 Km. radiuses 
(**) Based on the locations of stations selling Gasoline 93 
Week 
Panel a) Evolution of retail margins (*) Panel b) Impact of the merger on local 
markets (Metropolitan Region) (*) (**) 
Black dots: Treatment group 




two variables have a significant effect, these are: the number of Copec gas stations operating between 2 
Km. and 3 Km. radiuses, and the number of Petrobras gas stations operating between 1 Km. and 2 Km. 
radiuses. However, the signs of the two coefficients associated to these variables display opposite signs, 
which suggests that there is no clear pattern explaining the selection of divestitures. 
 
3.3 Reduced-form approach 
 
Following Ashenfelter et al. (2015) and Friberg and Romahn (2015), I propose the use of a difference-in-
difference approach through the estimation of the following reduced-form equation: 
 






where � ,  is the margin (i.e., the difference between retail price and refinery price) of gas station � 
during week .  is a dummy variable equal to one if week  falls on the post-merger period (i.e. 
after July-2013), but before the divestitures are implemented (i.e., before January 2014).  is a 
dummy variable equal to one if week  falls on the period after the divestitures are implemented (i.e., 
after January 2014). The dummy variable  is equal to one if the following conditions are jointly 
satisfied: (i) gas station � is geographically affected by the merger, (ii) it is not divested after the merger, 
and (iii) there are no divested gas stations within a specific radius. The dummy variable _ �  
is equal to one if gas station � is geographically affected by the merger, and if it is divested after the 
merger.11 The dummy variable _ � _  is equal to one if gas station � is geographically 
affected by the merger, and if there is a divested gas station within a specific radius.12 Finally,  and  
are fixed effects terms for gas stations and weeks, respectively. 
 As I mention before, there is a group of divested stations that left the market shortly after being 
transferred to the winner bidders. Hence, the variables _ �  and _ � _  only 
consider the set of divested gas stations that continued operating after the transference. 
 
                                                          
11
 Depending on the size of the selected radius, it could be the case that a gas station not affected by the merger was 
divested. However, the variable _ �  does not account for these cases. 
12
 Similarly, depending on the size of the selected radius, it could be the case that a gas station not affected by the 






The first three columns of Table 4 contain the results from the estimation of Equation (1) considering 
radiuses of 1 Km., 2 Km. and 3 Km. around each gas station, respectively. Results suggest that before 
the implementation of the divestitures (i.e., between July-2013 and December-2013), the merger 
generates an average increase in margins between 0.5% and 0.6%, but only for gas stations that are not 
divested afterwards and do not face competition from divested gas stations within radiuses of 1 Km 
and 2 Km. After the execution of divestitures (i.e., after December-2013), the impact of the merger on 
margins becomes stronger. For gas stations not affected by divestments, the average increase in margins 
is approximately equal to 1.6% for all the selected radiuses (i.e., 1 Km., 2 Km. and 3 Km.).  
As expected by the Chilean Competition Authorities, margins of divested gas stations are 
significantly reduced by more than -2% on average after December-2013, and for all the selected 
radiuses. Regarding gas stations directly competing with these divested stations, their margins are also 
significantly reduced by more than -1.5% on average, but only when divested stations are close enough 
(i.e., within a 1 Km. radius). When the competing divested station is located within a 2 Km. radius, the 
impact of the merger on margins becomes positive, but with a very weak magnitude. Finally, when the 
competing divested station is located within a 3 Km. radius, the impact of the merger on margins is 
similar for stations facing and not facing competition from divested stations. Thus, the implementation 
of the divestitures offsets the impact of the merger on prices, but only for stations closely located to 
divested stations (i.e., within a 2 Km. radius). 
The last three columns of Table 4 display the results of a model that incorporates interactions 
between the variables capturing the impact of the merger after the execution of the divestitures, and the 
identity of gas stations.  Specifically, gas stations are classified into three groups: insiders (i.e., Shell and 
Terpel), outsiders (i.e., Copec and Petrobras), and other brands (i.e., unbranded gas stations and smaller 
alternative brands). Results suggest that the impact of the merger on margins of gas stations not facing 
competition from divested stations is practically identical for insiders and outsiders. In addition, the 
impact of the merger on unbranded stations and small alternative brands is not significantly different 
from zero, but only for the equation that considers 1 Km. radiuses (i.e., column (4) in Table 4). Finally, 
regarding the impact of divestitures, their impact is symmetric for insiders and outsiders, but it is 
considerably stronger for unbranded and small alternative brands. 
These results are robust to the introduction of clustered standard errors at the commune level. 





Table 4 – Results Equation (1) (Gasoline 93, national level) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) 
VARIABLES 1 Km. radius 2 Km. radius 3 Km. radius 1 Km. radius 2 Km. radius 3 Km. Radius 
Anticompetitive effect       ∙  0.00536*** 0.00546*** 0.00590*** 0.00517*** 0.00540*** 0.00589*** 
 (0.000484) (0.000357) (0.000375) (0.000484) (0.000357) (0.000375) ∙  0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0159***    
 (0.000378) (0.000277) (0.000293)    × � �     0.0172*** 0.0166*** 0.0147*** 
    (0.000497) (0.000385) (0.000401) × �     0.0175*** 0.0171*** 0.0169*** 
    (0.000545) (0.000343) (0.000368) × ℎ     0.000498 0.00644*** 0.0161*** 
    (0.00126) (0.000880) (0.000771) 
Divestitures       ∙ _ �  -0.00156 -0.00144 -0.00169* -0.00156 -0.00144 -0.00169* 
 (0.00128) (0.000973) (0.000914) (0.00128) (0.000972) (0.000913) ∙ _ �  -0.0248*** -0.0220*** -0.0226*** -0.0248*** -0.0220*** -0.0226*** 
 (0.00101) (0.000759) (0.000721) (0.00101) (0.000759) (0.000720) 
Neighbors of divested gas 
stations 
      
∙ _ � _  -0.00253*** 0.00222*** 0.00671*** -0.00269*** 0.00213*** 0.00663*** 
 (0.000739) (0.000443) (0.000355) (0.000739) (0.000442) (0.000354) ∙ _ � _  -0.0154*** 0.00157*** 0.0142***    
 (0.000575) (0.000346) (0.000280)    × � �     -0.0127*** -0.00200*** 0.0115*** 
    (0.000860) (0.000530) (0.000416) × �     -0.0160*** 0.00517*** 0.0170*** 
    (0.000734) (0.000424) (0.000325) × ℎ     -0.0333*** -0.0101*** -0.00196** 
    (0.00250) (0.00107) (0.000924) 
       
 5.917*** 5.918*** 5.919*** 5.917*** 5.918*** 5.919*** 
 (0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00131) (0.00132) (0.00132) (0.00131) 
       
Station and week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 203,345 203,345 203,345 203,345 203,345 203,345 
R-squared 0.794 0.796 0.797 0.794 0.796 0.797 
Number of gas stations 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 
Standard errors in parentheses 





3.5.1 Presence of smaller competitors 
 
It is interesting to investigate whether the presence of unbranded stations and/or small alternative 
brand’s stations in a given geographic location is enough in order to offset the rise in prices generated 
by the merger. To answer this question, I re-estimate Equation (1) but adding interactions between the 
variables capturing the impact of the merger on margins of stations not affected by divestitures (i.e., the 
variable ∙  in Equation 1), and the presence of small brands. Specifically, I introduce the 
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dummy variable _ ℎ  which is equal to one when an unbranded station and/or a station that 
belongs to a small alternative brand are located within a specific radius. Results are reported in Table 5 
below.  
The results suggest that the presence of small brands mitigates the impact of the merger on 
prices, but only when they are located within a 1 Km. radius. Indeed, on the one hand, with presence of 
small brands within a 1 Km. radius, the post-merger margins are only increased by 0.3% and 0.5% on 
average for insiders and outsiders, respectively. On the other hand, without presence of small brands 
within a 1 Km. radius, post-merger margins are increased by 2.23% and 2.20% on average for insiders 
and outsiders, respectively.  
For larger radiuses, the presence of smaller brands does not seem to mitigate the impact of the 
merger on prices. 
 
Table 5 – Controlling by the presence of smaller brands (Gasoline 93, national level) (*) (**) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) 
VARIABLES 1 Km. radius 2 Km. radius 3 Km. radius 
    ∙     
    × � � × _ ℎ  0.00289*** 0.0142*** 0.0167*** 
 (0.000925) (0.000583) (0.000544) × � � × − _ ℎ  0.0223*** 0.0188*** 0.0136*** 
 (0.000570) (0.000476) (0.000537) × � × _ ℎ  0.00485*** 0.0156*** 0.0188*** 
 (0.00102) (0.000509) (0.000472) × � × − _ ℎ  0.0220*** 0.0187*** 0.0155*** 
 (0.000627) (0.000423) (0.000516) 
    
Station and week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182,054 182,054 182,054 
Number of gas stations 1,261 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.796 0.797 0.798 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(*) It only considers gas stations of large brands, namely: Shell, Terpel, Copec and Petrobras 
(**) The table only displays the coefficient estimates of the interactions with the variable _ ℎ  
 
 
3.5.2 Divested stations keeping the Terpel brand 
 
In order to increase the attractiveness of the auction implemented to execute the divestitures, Shell-
Terpel gave to the winner bidders the option to keep the Terpel brand for a period of 3 years after the 
acquisition. This policy could have a strategic component. Indeed, divested stations branded Terpel 
should be able to exploit the benefits of brand loyalty from consumers, and therefore, should be less 
aggressive when competing in prices. In order to capture the effect of this policy on margins, I re-
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estimated Equation (1) but adding interactions between the variables capturing the impact of 
divestitures, and the post-merger brand identity of divested stations. In particular, the dummy variable 
 is equal to one when the divested station � opted for keeping the Terpel brand, and it is equal to 
zero otherwise. Results are displayed in Table 6 below. 
Divested gas stations that opted for not keeping the Terpel brand are significantly more 
aggressive when pricing. Indeed, while their margins are reduced by more than -4.3% on average after 
the divestitures, the margins of gas stations that kept the Terpel brand are only reduced by less than -
1.3% on average. However, interestingly, margins of gas stations that belong to the merging parties and 
compete with divested stations are reduced by a higher percentage when the divested station kept the 
Terpel brand (but only within radiuses of 1 Km. and 2 Km.).  For non-merging parties (i.e., Copec and 
Petrobras) the effect of competition is similar regardless of the brand of the divested station. 
 
Table 6 – Controlling by the identity of divested stations (Gasoline 93, national level) (*) (**) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) 
VARIABLES 1 Km. radius 2 Km. radius 3 Km. radius 
    ∙ _ �     
    ×  -0.0127*** -0.00537*** -0.00606*** 
 (0.00119) (0.000970) (0.000902) × −  -0.0504*** -0.0430*** -0.0452*** 
 (0.00169) (0.00110) (0.00106) ∙ _ � _     
    × � � ×  -0.0150*** -0.00207*** 0.0139*** 
 (0.00104) (0.000647) (0.000453) × � � × −  -0.00829*** -0.000964 0.00809*** 
 (0.00144) (0.000784) (0.000554) × � ×  -0.0168*** 0.00402*** 0.0193*** 
 (0.000871) (0.000499) (0.000340) × � × −  -0.0144*** 0.00816*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.00127) (0.000620) (0.000436) 
    
Station and week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 182,054 182,054 182,054 
Number of gas stations 1,261 1,261 1,261 
R-squared 0.796 0.798 0.800 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(*) It only considers gas stations of large brands, namely: Shell, Terpel, Copec and Petrobras 









4. Conclusions  
 
The results suggest that the Terpel-Shell merger generated a modest but significant increase in margins 
of gas stations geographically affected by the merger. In addition, the implementation of divestitures 
seems to be an appropriate tool in order to mitigate the anticompetitive effects of this merger, but only 
for gas stations closely located to the divested ones (within a 2 Km. radius). 
I also answer two interesting empirical questions. First, I show how the presence of unbranded 
stations and/or stations that belong to small alternative brands seem to be enough in order to offset the 
impact of the merger on prices (but only when the unbranded and/or alternative brand is located within 
a 1 Km. radius). Second, results suggest that divested stations that opted for not keeping the Terpel 
brand are pricing more aggressively. However, interestingly it seems that the gas stations of the 
merging parties react stronger to the competition of divested stations that kept the Terpel brand. Thus, 
there is no evidence of strategic behavior intended to soften competition from divested gas stations. 
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Appendix A – Theoretical framework and proofs 
 
A.1 Properties of the profit function 
We consider a market with  single-product firms that compete in prices. The profit function of Firm � 
has the simple following form:  
 Π = − , (A.1) 
 
where  is the market share of Firm �, such that  and   for all ≠ �. We assume that 
the profit function Π , −  is strictly concave in , which implies that Π , − <  for all  and − . 
In addition, we assume that prices  and  are strategic complements, i.e., Π ,, −  for all � and 
, with ≠ �. 
 
A.2 Nash payoffs 
The pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices satisfies the following system of first-order 
conditions: 
 Λ , = , + ( , − ) , = , ∀�, (A.2) 
where ,  is the vector of pre-merger equilibrium prices. The strict concavity of the profit function 
guarantees that the first-order conditions are sufficient for a Nash equilibrium. (See Tirole 1988.) 
Let us define −  as the pre-merger best response function of Firm � given prices − . This 
function satisfies Λ − , − = , where Λ = Π . From the strict concavity assumption, it follows 
that there is a unique  such that = − . In addition, considering the assumption of strategic 
complementarity of prices, then  for all ≠ �. 
After a merger between Firms � and , the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices satisfies the 
following system of first-order conditions: 
 Λ̅ , = Λ , + ( , − ) , =  (A.3) 
 Λ̅ , = Λ , + ( , − ) , =  (A.4) 
 Λ̅ = , ∀ ≠ {�, }, (A.5) 
where ,  denotes the vector of post-merger equilibrium prices. The post-merger best response 
functions of the merging parties ̅ −  and ̅ −  satisfy Λ̅ ̅ − , − =  and  Λ̅ ( ̅ ( − ), − ) =
, and the post-merger best response function of Firm  for all ≠ {�, } satisfies Λ̅ ̅ − , − = .  
76 
 
Proposition 1: Consider a merger between Firms � and . The post-merger equilibrium prices ,  and ,  
are higher than or equal to the pre-merger equilibrium prices , and , , respectively. 
Proof: First, considering that ( − )  and − 0 for relevant values of  and , 
then the post-merger best response functions of Firms � and  satisfy  ℎ̅ = ̅ℎ −ℎ ℎ = ℎ −ℎ  for ℎ = {�. } and all −ℎ. In addition, the post-merger best response function of Firm  for all ≠ {�, }, 
satisfies ̅ − = −  for all − . Thus, ̅ − −  for all .  
Second, the fact that prices are strategic complements, i.e., Π , implies that  for all  and 
≠ , and ensures that  ̅  for ≠ {�, } and all ≠ .  Moreover, assuming that  and 
 for ≠ {�, }, ensures that ̅ℎ  for ℎ = {�. } and all ≠ {�, }. 
Finally, assuming that  and  guarantees strict concavity of the merged firm profit 
function. Thus, by Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994), the post-merger Nash equilibrium in 
prices satisfies , ,  for all . 
 
A.3 Collusion payoffs 
The joint-profit maximization (or perfect-collusion) vector of prices  is obtained by solving: Π � =� ,…, ∑ Π ,… ,= . 
We only consider cases in which the perfect-collusion payoffs of every firm in the market are 
higher than the one-period Nash equilibrium payoffs, i.e., Π ,… , Π , , … , ,  for all �. 
Finally, note that the vector of collusion prices is independent of the ownership of the different products 
in the market. In other words, a merger does not have any impact on . 
 
A.4 Pre-merger deviation payoffs 
The pre-merger deviation payoffs of Firm � are given by: 
 Π , = Π , , − = ( , − ) ( , , − ) , (A.6) 
where ,  is the pre-merger deviation price of Firm � and −  is the vector of collusion prices for the 
rest of the firms in the market. The price ,  satisfies:  
 Λ , , − = ( , , − ) + , − , �, − = . (A.7) 
 
A.5 Post-merger deviation payoffs 
The post-merger deviation payoffs of the merged firm are given by: 
 Π , , = Π ( , , , , − , ) + Π , , , , − , = (A.8) 
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( , − ) ( , , , , − , ) + ( , − ) ( , , , , − , ) , 
where ,  and ,  are the post-merger deviation prices of Firms � and ,  and − ,  is the vector of 
collusion prices of the rest of the firms in the market. The pair of prices ,  and ,  satisfy: 
 ( , , , , − , ) + ( , − ) , , , , − , +( , − ) , , , , − , = , (A.9) 
and, 
 ( , , , , − , ) + ( , − ) , , , , − , +
( , − ) , , , , − , = . (A.10) 
 
Proposition 2: For every Firm , its pre-merger and post-merger deviation prices ,  and ,   are lower 
than or equal to its perfect-collusion price .  
Proof: Considering that ℎ  for all ℎ and , with ℎ ≠ , then a deviation price higher than  would 
jointly increase the profits of Firm  and every Firm ℎ, for ℎ ≠ , which is not consistent with the fact 
that the vector of collusion prices  is the one that maximizes the joint-profits of all the firms in the 
market. Hence, the price that maximizes Firm ’s deviation payoffs is lower than .  
 
Proposition 3: Consider a merger between Firms � and . If the post-merger deviation price of Firm  belongs to 
the interval [ , , ], and the pricing externality that Firm  exerts on Firm i is stronger than the marginal 
effect of  on Π , , , , − , , then the post-merger deviation price of Firm � is higher than its pre-merger 
deviation price.  
Proof: Considering that prices  and  are strategic complements, then the price  that maximizes Π , , , − ,  for , ∈  [ , , ], is lower than , , which in turn implies that Λ , , , , − , < . Thus, considering post-merger deviation prices ,  and , ∈ [ , , ], and considering that the pricing externality that Firm  exerts on Firm �, i.e., ( , −
) , �, , , − , , is higher than the marginal effect of  on Π , , , , − ,  in absolute 
value, i.e., |Λ , , , , − , |, and assuming that  for relevant values of  and , then the 






Appendix B – Simulation setting 
Table B.1 – List of papers extracted from Knittel and Metaxoglou (2014) 
Journal Authors Industry Observations  
Rand Journal of Economics Armantier and Richard 
(2008) 
Airlines  
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -2.22 0.50 -2.79 -1.54 
Cross-price elast. 0.21 0.09 0.09 0.35 
Rand Journal of Economics Bonnet and Dubois (2010) Bottled Water 
(Retail) 
Averages computed among brands and 
retailers 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -9.97 1.87 -12.96 -4.97 
Cross-price elast. 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.11 
Rand Journal of Economics Copeland (2011) Automobile The cross-price elasticities are computed 
between vintages of the same model  
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -2.61 0.49 -3.60 -1.50 
Cross-price elast. 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.17 
Rand Journal of Economics Iizuka (2007) Prescription 
Drugs 
Only the average own-price elasticity is 
provided 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -2.3 - - - 
Cross-price elast. - - - - 
Rand Journal of Economics Nevo (2000) Ready-to-Eat 
Cereals 
We only report the cross-price elast. between 
Kellogg and General Mills. Brands 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -2.18 0.76 -3.70 -1.32 
Cross-price elast. 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.13 
Rand Journal of Economics Villas-Boas (2009) Coffee (Retail) We report the mean elasticities across 
manufacturers 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -7.63 0.66 -8.47 -6.80 
Cross-price elast. 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.07 
Econometrica Goeree (2008) Personal 
Computer 
 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -6.65 3.25 -12.86 -3.26 
Cross-price elast. 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.09 
Econometrica Nevo (2001) Ready-to-Eat 
Cereal 
We only report the cross-price elast. between 
Kellogg and General Mills. Brands 
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -3.02 0.64 -4.25 -2.28 
Cross-price elast. 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.24 
Review of Economic Studies Nakamura and Zerom (2010) Coffee The median price elasticity from the Logit with 
random coefficients estimation  
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -3.46 - - - 
Cross-price elast. - - - - 
Review of Economic Studies Villas-Boas (2007) Supermarkets   
 Mean Std. Dev Min. Max. 
Own-price elast. -5.71 0.64 -6.74 -4.67 











Table B.2 Baseline simulations setting 
Parameter Baseline Setting 
 
Number of firms is fixed to 5 for all the markets. 
Each firm produces only one product. 
 Number of consumers is set to 10,000 for all the markets. 
 Number of simulations for computing the expected market shares is fixed to 1,000 for all the markets. 
 (*) It is constant within each market, but it varies across markets with uniform distribution �[ ,̅]. 
̃  For a given market varies among consumers with exponential distribution �⁄ . 
The parameter �  is distributed uniformly �[ ,7] across markets. 
 (*) It is constant within each market, but it varies across markets with uniform distribution �[ ,̅ ]. 
  It is constant within each market, but it varies across markets with uniform distribution �[ , ]. 
̃ , , ̃ ,  For a given market both vary among consumers with normal distributions [ ,� ] and [ ,� ]. The 
parameters �  and �  are distributed uniformly �[ , ] across markets. 
̃ , , ̃ ,  They are both drawn from an extreme value distribution [�], where the scale parameter  is equal to 
0.5. � ,  (*) For each market � , = exp � ∙ �  where � = .  and �  are distributed normally with [ ,�� ]. � ,  For each market � , = I >  where  are distributed normally with [ , ]. �  For each market �  is drawn from a normal distribution [ , ]. 
�̃ ,  For a given market varies among consumers with normal distribution [ ,��]. The parameter �  is 
distributed uniformly �[ , ] across markets. 
 For each market  is drawn from a normal distribution [ , . ]. 
,  Both are fixed for each market, but they vary across markets with the same uniform distribution �[ , ]. 
(*) Parameters that are modified in each calibration. See Table B.3 below 
 
Table B.3 Calibrations 
Calibration 
Parameters ̅ ̅  σx  
(1) 15 1.1 5 
(2) 8 1.1 5 
(3) 3 1.1 5 
(4) 15 4 5 
(5) 8 4 5 
(6) 3 4 5 
(7) 15 1.1 2 
(8) 8 1.1 2 
(9) 3 1.1 2 
(10) 15 4 2 
(11) 8 4 2 











Table B.4 Data cleaning 
Calibration           Total 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)  
1 367 1,020 4 443  1 6 1 11 223 2,076 
2 411 365 7 243   13 1 9 393 1,442 
3 440 96 17 22  1 19 8 3 399 1,005 
4 547 911 3 584   12  5 254 2,316 
5 682 285 4 383   24 2 7 413 1,800 
6 687 77 6 54 1  29 7 2 504 1,367 
7 121 883 6 531   10 1 4 82 1,638 
8 140 264 5 202  1 9  3 130 754 
9 159 63 9 6 1  16 1 3 99 357 
10 207 691 4 717   15 1 1 93 1,729 
11 265 166 1 281   15 1 7 133 869 
12 278 33 3 12  1 14 6 3 108 458 
Total 4,304 4,854 69 3,478 2 4 182 29 58 2,831 15,811 
Percentage 11.96% 13.48% 0.19% 9.66% 0.01% 0.01% 0.51% 0.08% 0.16% 7.86% 43.92% 
(1) The solution of the fixed-point algorithm that computes equilibrium prices does not converge (after a maximum of 200 iterations). 
(2) At least one of the brands’ pre-merger market shares is equal to zero. 
(3) “t least one of the brands’ pre-merger own-price elasticities is lower than 1. 
(4) Observations with extreme elasticity values. (Own-price elast. lower than -19.16266 and/or cross-price elast. higher than 4.061562.) 
(5) It was possible to find a profitable deviation from the pre-merger Nash equilibrium (for Firm 1). With a margin of error of +/- 1%. 
(6) It was possible to find a profitable deviation from the post-merger Nash equilibrium (Firms 1 and 2). With a margin of error of +/- 1%. 
(7) The pre-merger (perfect) collusion prices founded by two different algorithms do not coincide. With a margin of error of +/- 1%. 
(8) The deviation prices found by using two different sets of starting values do not coincide. With a margin of error of +/- 1%. 
(9) The merger is not feasible (the total profits of the merged firm are lower than sum of the pre-merger profits of the merging parties). 
(10) Perfect-collusion is not feasible (At least one of the collusion profits is lower than the Nash equilibrium profits). 
 




Own-price elasticity (Firm 1) Cross-price elasticity (Firm 1 / Firm 2) 
Panel a) Own-price elasticity by calibration setting Panel b) Cross-price elasticity by calibration setting 
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Appendix C – Figures and tables (Chapter 1) 
 
Table C.1 – CRDF estimates extracted from Davis and Huse (2010) and Brito et al. (2013) 
   Estimated CRDF  
Paper Market Firm (*) Pre-merger Post-merger % Var. 
Davis and Huse 
(2010) 
Network server industry Compaq 0.303 
0.246 -61.1% 
EU, 4-10 price segment HP 0.632 
(Merger: Compaq-HP) Unisys 0.724 0.782 8.0% 
Network server industry Compaq 0.528 
0.482 -19.3% 
Japan, 4-10 price segment HP 0.597 
(Merger: Compaq-HP) Hitachi 0.632 0.642 1.5% 
Network server industry Compaq 0.549 
0.530 -23.9% 
US, 4-10 price segment HP 0.697 
(Merger: Compaq-HP) Data Gen 0.817 0.832 1.8% 
Brito et al. (2013) 
Wet Shaving Industry Wilkinson Sword 0.815 
0.260 -68.1% 
(Merger WS-Gillette) Gillette 0.262 
 A Safety Razor 0.888 0.894 0.68% 
Wet Shaving Industry Wilkinson Sword 0.815 
0.788 -3.31% 
(Merger WS-WL) Warner-Lambert 0.790 
 A Safety Razor 0.888 0.890 0.23% 
(*) Only selected firms: merging parties and the outsider with the highest CRDF 
 




Change in payoffs 
 Insiders Outsiders 




It cancels out the 
previous effect (*)  




It weakens the 
previous effect (*) 
Pro-collusive 
Collusion (3) % of cases ∆Π >  99.97% 0.14% 
  Interpretation Pro-collusive Anti-collusive 
Comparison (4) % of cases |∆Π | > |∆ΠN| 98.33% - 
 (5) % of cases |∆Π | > |∆Π | - 83.82% 
  Prediction Pro-collusive Ambiguous 
 Observations 38,024 57,036 











Table C.3 – The impact of higher product differentiation on post-merger payoffs 




Change in payoffs 
 Insiders Outsiders 




It weakens the 
previous effect (*) 




It weakens the 
previous effect (*) 
Pro-collusive 
Collusion (3) % of cases ∆Π >  98.69% 3.56% 
  Interpretation Pro-collusive Anti-collusive 
Comparison (4) % of cases |∆Π | > |∆ΠN| 98.38% - 
 (5) % of cases |∆Π | > |∆Π | - 66.73% 
  Prediction Pro-collusive Ambiguous 
 Observations 17,924 26,886 
*  Where previous effect  refers to the impact of the merger before efficiency gains 
**  The term � ,  �  stands for the pre-merger difference between the continuous characteristic of the product sold by 
Firm 1 and the average continuous characteristic from the rest of products in the market 
 













(*) For the sake of exposition, the graphs only display changes within the interval [-0.1, 0.1]. 
Additional CRDF change Additional CRDF change 
Panel a) Merged firm Panel b) Outsiders 
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Figure C.2 – The magnitude of the CP and AP effects (Merged firm)  
 






CP effect Pre-merger CRDF difference 
Panel a) CP effect (by equilibrium payoffs’ ratio  *  Panel b) AP effect (by equilibrium payoffs´ ratio) (**) 
 (*) For the sake of exposition, it only considers cases where the CP effect is lower than 0.1 
(**) It only considers mergers from Case (a) (as defined in Section 5.1.2) 
*  For the sake of exposition, it only considers equilibrium payoff’s changes lower than the th percentile value 
Change in equilibrium payoffs Change in equilibrium payoffs 
Panel a) Post-merger equilibrium payoffs’ 
change and pre-merger diversion ratios (*) 
Panel b) Post-merger equilibrium payoffs’ 
change and pre-merger own-price elasticities (*) 
 
Panel c) Post-merger deviation payoffs’ 
change and pre-merger diversion ratios  
Panel d) Post-merger deviation payoffs’ 
change and pre-merger own-price elasticities 
Change in deviation payoffs Change in deviation payoffs 
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Figure C.4 – The magnitude of ∆ � � (Merged firm) (*) 
Comparison between Cases a) and b) (by equilibrium payoffs’ ratio) 
 
 













(*) For the sake of exposition, it only considers cases where the Overall Effect is lower than 0.1 
(*) It only considers the change on the CRDF of Firm 3. In addition, for the sake of exposition, the graphs only display 
changes lower than 1 
**  Where High diversion ratio  Low diversion ratio  stands for firms with a diversion ratio higher (lower) than the 50th 
percentile value. While Strong CP effect  Weak CP effect  stands for cases where the CP effect on the merged firm 
CRDF is higher (lower) than the 75th (25th) percentile value. 
CRDF change CRDF change 
Panel a) Low pre-merger diversion ratio (**) Panel b) High pre-merger diversion ratio (**) 
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Appendix D – Computation of the ACPP 
 
The actual pre-merger price increase motivated by PAC and initiated by Firm �, denoted by  ,  , for � = ,  , is computed as follows: 
 , = � {� + , − + � ( + , + , − ,− ) − }, 
 
where the superscript  stands for a Nash equilibrium price. 
While the actual post-merger percentage price increases initiated by the merged firm and Firm 
, denoted by ,  and ̅ , , respectively,  are obtained with the following equations: 
 , = � {� ( + , + , − ,− ) + � ( + , + , − ,− ) + � ( +, + , + , − ,− ,− ) −       + � + , + , + , − ,− ,− − } −� {� ( + , + , − ,− ) − + � ( + , + , − ,− ) − }, 
 
and; ̅ , = � {� + , − + � ( + , + , + , − ,− ,− ) − }. 
 
The pre-merger ACPP is given by: 
 ACPP = m�n{SI, , SI,  }. 
 
The post-merger ACPP is given by: 
 ACPP , = m�n{SI, , ̅ , }. 
 
Finally, the impact of the merger on firms’ actual incentives to engage in P“C is given by: 








Appendix E – Derivation of the alternative CPPI indexes 
 
E.1 Derivation of the alternative versions of the post-merger CPPI 
We propose a modified version of the CPPI that takes into consideration the strategic interactions 
between the brands produced by the merged firm. For the construction of this index we closely follow 
the methodology proposed by Moresi et al. (2011).  
 
E.1.1 Acquiring firm (Firm A) 
1. At period  the acquiring firm increases the prices of its two brands by  percent. It incurs in a 
loss of profits equal to the difference between: (i) the value of the divested sales generated by 
the price increase, and (ii) the higher price charged on its remaining sales. This is given by the 
following expression: 
 = [ ∙ ∙ − ∙ ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙  +   [ ∙ ∙ − ∙ ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙  −   [ − ∙ ∙ + ∙ ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙  −   [ − ∙ ∙ + ∙ ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙ . 
 
We define ∆ = ∙ − ∙ ∙   and  ∆ = ∙ − ∙ ∙  , and the previous 
formula becomes: 
 = ∙ ∆ ∙ ∙    +    ∙ ∆ ∙ ∙  −   [ − ∙ ∆ ] ∙ ∙    −    [ − ∙ ∆ ] ∙ ∙ . 
 
2. Assuming that from period +  onward, the price increase is followed by Firm , then the 
acquiring firm gets profits equal to the difference between: (i) the higher price charged on its 
overall sales, including the fraction of divested sales from Firm  that are captured by the 
acquiring firm, and (ii) the value of the divested sales generated by the price increase. Thus, the 
per-period gain from PAC is given by: 
 




3. Assuming that Firm  permanently matches the price increase, then the acquiring firm chooses   in order to maximize the present value of its expected payoffs. Therefore, the optimal price 
increase, i.e., ∗ , is found by maximizing the following expression: 
 ∗ = � {− + − ∙ , }, 
and is given by; 




,̆ = ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙  +  ∙ ∙       ,       ,̃ = ∙ ∙ ∙  + D ∙ , = − � ∙ ∙                         � = , , = � ∙                                           � = , .    
4. However, we need to make an additional adjustment to this formula. Provided that the PAC 
incentives are evaluated at the pre-merger prices, the acquiring firm has an incentive to initiate 
a unilateral percentage price increase . Therefore, since the ∗  considers the strategic 
interactions between the merged firm brands, it also nests this unilateral price increase . In 
order to clean our index from this effect, we propose the following corrected formula: ,∗∗ =,∗ − .  
The unilateral price increase  can be found by maximizing the following expression: 
 = � { − ∙ } , 
 
and it is given by; = ++ × . 
 
Thus, the post-merger percentage price increase that the acquiring firm is willing to initiate, and 
only motivated by PAC (on top of the unilateral effects of the merger), is given by: 




Finally, considering the same set of assumptions than in Section 2.21, the previous formula is 
simplified to: 
 , = � , + −�− − � , ×      −      , , 
 � ℎ         , = ++ e                             , = − −−  × . 
 
E.1.2 Outsider firm (Firm B)  
1. At period  the outsider firm increases it price by  percent. It incurs in a loss of profits equal 
to the difference between: (i) the value of the divested sales generated by the price increase, and 
(ii) the higher price charged on its remaining sales. This is given by the following expression: 
 = [ ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙ −    [ − ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙ . 
 
2. Assuming that from period +  onward, the price increase is followed by Firm , then the 
outsider firm gets profits equal to the difference between: (i) the higher price charged on its 
overall sales, incorporating the divested sales from the brands of the merged firm, and (ii) the 
value of the divested sales generated by the price increase. Thus the per-period gain from PAC 
is given by: 
 = [ − ∙ ∙ + ∙ ∙ ∙ + ∙ ∙ ∙ ] ∙ ∙  −    ∙ ∙ − ∙ ∙ ∙ − ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙ . 
 
3. Assuming that Firm  matches the price increase permanently, then Firm  chooses  S  in 
order to maximize the present value of its expected payoffs. Therefore, the optimal S∗  is found 
by maximizing the following expression: 
 SI,∗ = max {−L S + δ−δ ∙ � S }, 
 
and is given by; 
                                                          
1 The assumptions are: 
1. The prices, margins and own-price elasticities of the brands produced by the merged firm are the same ( = ,  =   and  = ). 
2. The diversion ratios between the brands produced by the merged firm are identical ( = ). 
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 SI,∗ = δF ,̆ −θ−δF ,̆ × m , 
with: 
 � ,̆ = e + ee                      and                     θ = − m e . 
 
Finally, considering the same set of assumptions than in section 2.2, the previous formula is 
simplified to: 
 SI, = δ� ,̃ − θ− δ� ,̃ ×m               w�t�            � ,̃ = e q DR + q DRq e      
 
E.2 Alternative versions of the CPPI 
Finally, and considering the previous formulas, the corrected versions of the post-merger CPPI 
variations are given by: 
 ∆CPPI , = m�n{SI, , SI, } − m�n{SI , SI }, 
and; 

















Appendix F – Database cleaning 
 
 Geographic coordinates 
A database received in September-2013 (from the Chilean Sectorial Regulator, i.e., the 
Comisión Nacional de Energía  - www.cne.cl) is used to approximate the structure of the 
market by the time of the merger, i.e., June-2013. Note that since the auction implemented to 
proceed with the divestitures took place in September 4th 2013 and the transfer of the divested 
stations only started in October-2013, this is a good approximation. 
The 2013 database does not contain geographic coordinates. Thus I matched the 2013 
addresses with the coordinates’ information provided by the database received in February-
2015 (using the station id variable). There are 36 stations (2.27%) that did not match. The most 
likely reason is that these stations left the market. These are stations from three small alternative 
brands (Autogasco (6), Lipigas (16) and Coopeserau (5)), some unbranded stations (8) and one 
from Terpel (1).  
 
 Dropped stations from the sample 
I have pre and post-merger price data for 1550 gas stations. There are 9 communes 
where I could not identify the addresses of divested stations. These communes were dropped 
from the sample, which reduces the sample to 1439 stations. In addition, I also dropped the 
commune Lota  because the station that was supposed to be divested stopped reporting prices 
during week 68 (before week 80 when the merger took place). After this adjustment, the sample 
contains 1435 stations. 
Finally, stations with very low pricing activity (changing prices on less than 45% of the 
weeks) were also deleted from the sample. This reduces the sample to 1419 gas stations.  
 
 The divestment dummies 
The deadline to subscribe the divestment contracts was October 16th 2013. Most of the 
contracts were signed before December 27th 2013. However, since I do not know the exact date 
in each case, I set the divestment dummy to be equal to 1 for every month starting on January-
. There are a few exceptions. First, for the divested gas stations located in Paillaco , 
Peñalolen , Castro , San Felipe , Parral , Talca , Temuco , Illapel , ”uin  and 
Paine , the contracts were signed between December 28th 2013 and January 15th 2014. 
Therefore, for these cases the divestment dummy is equal to 1 for every month starting on 
February- . Second, regarding the divested gas station in San ”ernardo , the contract was 
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signed on April-2014, thus the divestment dummy takes the value of 1 starting on May-2014 in 
this case. Finally, in the case of Maipu , the divestment contract was signed on March-2014. 


































Appendix G – Tables (Chapter 3) 
 
Table G.1 – Logit model – Probability of being divested (Communes with divestitures, Shell-Terpel stations) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
VARIABLES _ �  _ �  _ �  _ �  _ �  
      lo�( � , ) -2.012   -2.510 -3.777 
 (4.039)   (4.199) (4.957) _   -0.447  -0.488 -0.168 
  (0.470)  (0.478) (0.510) � _ �   0.00924  0.0671 -0.130 
  (0.459)  (0.473) (0.488) _ � _ �   -0.194  -0.188 0.0418 
  (0.346)  (0.347) (0.376) _ _ �   -0.272  -0.341 -0.117 
  (0.572)  (0.583) (0.623) ℎ   -  - - 
  -  - - _ _    -0.00893  -0.00979 
   (0.180)  (0.187) _ _ _    -0.214  -0.225* 
   (0.133)  (0.133) _ _ _    0.160**  0.141* 
   (0.0794)  (0.0825) _ _    0.132  0.139 
   (0.288)  (0.298) _ _ _    -0.621***  -0.587** 
   (0.232)  (0.237) _ _ _    -0.0987  -0.0878 
   (0.194)  (0.196) _ _    -1.392  -1.521 
   (1.006)  (1.043) _ _ _    0.611  0.567 
   (0.381)  (0.391) _ _ _    -0.498  -0.519 
   (0.447)  (0.475) _ ℎ _    -0.0632  -0.105 
   (0.481)  (0.497) _ ℎ _ _    0.503  0.501 
   (0.549)  (0.556) _ ℎ _ _    -  - 
Table G.1 (Extended) 
 
  -  - 
 10.63 -1.223*** -1.061*** 13.88 21.84 
 (24.31) (0.241) (0.277) (25.26) (29.90) 
      












Table G.2 – Results Equation (1) (Gasoline 93, national level) 
Clustered Standard Errors – Commune Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) lo�( � , ) 
VARIABLES 1 Km. radius 2 Km. radius 3 Km. radius 1 Km. radius 2 Km. radius 3 Km. radius 
       ∙  0.00536* 0.00546** 0.00590** 0.00517* 0.00540** 0.00589** 
 (0.00279) (0.00218) (0.00257) (0.00277) (0.00218) (0.00257) ∙  0.0162*** 0.0162*** 0.0159***    
 (0.00607) (0.00527) (0.00542)    × � �     0.0172*** 0.0166*** 0.0147*** 
    (0.00564) (0.00523) (0.00545) × �     0.0175** 0.0171*** 0.0169*** 
    (0.00710) (0.00576) (0.00593) × ℎ     0.000498 0.00644 0.0161** 
    (0.00609) (0.00596) (0.00687) ∙ _ �  -0.00156 -0.00144 -0.00169 -0.00156 -0.00144 -0.00169 
 (0.00469) (0.00365) (0.00377) (0.00469) (0.00365) (0.00377) ∙ _ �  -0.0248** -0.0220** -0.0226** -0.0248** -0.0220** -0.0226** 
 (0.00999) (0.0100) (0.00981) (0.00999) (0.0100) (0.00981) ∙ _ � _  -0.00253 0.00222 0.00671*** -0.00269 0.00213 0.00663*** 
 (0.00221) (0.00197) (0.00233) (0.00220) (0.00197) (0.00232) ∙ _ � _  -0.0154* 0.00157 0.0142**    
 (0.00797) (0.00695) (0.00640)    × � �     -0.0127 -0.00200 0.0115* 
    (0.00781) (0.00662) (0.00623) × �     -0.0160* 0.00517 0.0170** 
    (0.00878) (0.00795) (0.00676) × ℎ     -0.0333*** -0.0101 -0.00196 
    (0.00469) (0.0117) (0.00962) 
 5.917*** 5.918*** 5.919*** 5.917*** 5.918*** 5.919*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00288) (0.00288) (0.00283) (0.00286) (0.00286) 
       
Station and week fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 203,345 203,345 203,345 203,345 203,345 203,345 
R-squared 0.794 0.796 0.797 0.794 0.796 0.797 
Number of gas stations 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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